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The Most Dangerous Spot on Earth: First Origins and the Early Cold War

For the better part of the Twentieth century, the Middle East, and more
specifically the Persian Gulf, have been areas of key importance to the United States. As
the United States became increasingly reliant on Middle Eastern oil, it became more
attuned to events in the Persian Gulf, seeking to create a regional order conducive to US
interests. First and foremost among those interests were cheap and easily accessible oil,
and a security situation which would not impede the flow of oil to the West. In order to
create this situation, the US has sought to exert its influence on all of the states of the
Persian Gulf. Among those states was Iraq. With proven oil reserves estimated by OPEC
to be the fourth largest in the world, Iraq has always been valued by the US as a
geopolitical prize.1 While certainly not the sole interest in Iraq, oil proved to be the most
important and enduring interest. In the course of pursuing its national interests, the US
thrust itself into a deeply divided country with a troubled and violent history. In doing so,
the US engaged in a series of ill-advised and short-sighted policy decisions, which in turn
have provoked conflict, led to the deaths of millions of Iraqis, the destruction of a society,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the destabilization of the Middle East.
Underlying this is a paradoxical phenomenon: the more the US attempted to bring Iraq
under US sway and control, the more out of control the situation became. The more
recent suffering of Iraq, from the US invasion to the scourge of ISIL, is very much a
product of almost a century of US-Iraq relations. Then, as now, the relationship was
based first and foremost around oil.

“OPEC share of world crude oil reserves, 2017”, OPEC, accessed 21 February 2019,
https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
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In 1914, the Ottoman Grand Vizier oversaw the formation of an international oil
consortium. Together with French, German, and Dutch interests, the Turkish Petroleum
Company (TPC) was formed, granting its members the right to exploit oil within the
Ottoman Middle East, including the three provinces which would become Iraq.2 After the
end of World War I, the French acquired the German shares. Claiming the mandate
powers awarded by the League of Nations gave them exclusive rights over natural
resources within mandate territory, the British and French sought to exclude any other
state, including the US, from breaking up their duopoly. The US complained bitterly
about the Anglo-French recalcitrance. It was American intervention in the trenches of
World War I which turned the tide of the war in favour of the Allies, and it was due
largely to US initiative that the League of Nations was established, they argued. Yet
Britain and France were unswayed. “The Anglo-French combination is determined to
keep American companies out of the new oil fields of the Near East,” complained Hugh
Wallace, US Ambassador to France.3 Yet the US remained steadfast, demanding a quid
pro quo for its efforts in World War I, driven by a growing energy demand.
In 1921, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover organized America’s sevenlargest oil companies into a formidable consortium to take on the British and French. Its
members included SOCONY (later Mobil), New Jersey (later Esso/Exxon), Texaco,
Sinclair, Mexican, Atlantic, and Gulf. Britain and France gave in. With the Ottomans
gone, the US was invited into the new consortium, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). In
order to contain US ambitions, Britain and France made US membership conditional to a
clause subjecting oil exploitation strictly within the IPC framework. In return, the US was
2
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awarded a 23.75 percent share in the consortium.4 For the US, it was a resounding
diplomatic victory. However, they had yet to grasp the jackpot they had stumbled upon.
Uncertain of the true volume of oil in IPC territory, the investment was very much a
gamble. Amid domestic fears of an impending oil shortage, shared among politicians,
scientists, and engineers, the investment was regarded as prudent. In 1919, the director of
the Bureau of Mines warned that “within the next two to five years the oil in this country
will reach their maximum production, and from that time on we will face an everincreasing decline,” while United States Geological Survey director George Otis Smith
warned of a “gasoline famine.”5 Ultimately the gamble paid off, with the discovery of oil
in Kirkuk in 1927.6 With oil yet to be discovered in Saudi Arabia, and a British monopoly
on Iranian oil, at that time Iraq represented America’s greatest hope of extracting oil from
the Middle East. Thus marked the beginning of the long and troubled relationship
between Iraq and the US.
In order to do business in the IPC, the US found itself needing to be on friendly
terms with the Iraqi monarchy and Britain. As such, this ensured that Britain would take
the lead role in maintaining an order conducive to western interests in Iraq, especially
through military force, while the US could reap the benefits, with little to no cost to the
US. The modern state of Iraq was, after all, an artificial creation of Britain, as was the
Hashimi monarchy installed by Britain following the suppression of the 1920 rebellion. It
would not be until certain developments from 1945 onwards, with the strategic
partnership forged between the US and Saudi Arabia, the deepening energy dependence
4
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on the Middle East, supporting the creation of the state of Israel, and the start of the Cold
War that the US took on greater direct and indirect role in influencing Iraqi affairs.
While many policymakers would not have known it, the US would later become
deeply entrenched in Iraq. In seeking to exert its power over Iraq, it would have
behooved the US to study the British experience. The most important lesson to be derived
from the British experience in Iraq is that while certain measures would succeed in
bringing short-term stability, in the longer term it would only breed resentment and lead
to a larger conflagration.
In 1917, as part of an effort to deprive the Ottoman empire of its Arab territories
during World War I, the British invaded the provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul.
Out of these three provinces, Britain hobbled together the modern state of Iraq. The
British attempted to rule over the country directly, appointing Percy Cox as High
Commissioner of Iraq. By May 1920, Iraqi resentment boiled over, following efforts by
the British authorities to levy taxes and arrest some recalcitrant tribal chiefs.7 The scale
and severity of the rebellion was made evident by how widespread it was, cutting across
deep sectarian and ethnic divisions. Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked:
It is an extraordinary thing that the British civil administration should have
succeeded in such a short time in alienating the whole country to such an extent
that the Arabs have laid aside the blood feuds that they have nursed for centuries
and that the Suni [sic] and Shiah [sic] tribes are working together. We have even
been advised locally that the best way to get our supplies up the river would be to
fly the Turkish flag, which would be respected by the tribesmen.8
The British used the latest technology, including air power, to crush the rebellion. Royal
Air Force Wing Commander Arthur “Bomber” Harris remarked: “The Arab and Kurd

Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New
York: Barnes and Noble, 2004), 81
8 Ibid, 88
7
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now know what real bombing means in casualties and damage. Within forty-five minutes
a full-sized village can practically be wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or
injured.”9
With its resources stretched thin after World War I, the British government
understood that continued occupation and direct rule over Iraq would provoke further
revolts, which the British treasury could ill afford.10 Unwilling to leave completely,
Britain opted to rule through proxy. During the 1921 Cairo conference, British leaders
and leading orientalists elected to establish a monarchy in Iraq, led by Faisal al-Hashimi.
Faisal was an outsider with no support base in Iraq, who would be wholly reliant on a
foreign power to maintain his rule. After British support for his leadership of the Hijazi
revolt, then allowing the French to invade Syria and topple his Damascus-based Arab
kingdom, Faisal had nowhere to go. As such, the British saw in Faisal a pliant proxy, one
which Churchill described as having the additional benefit of providing “[the] best
chance of saving our money.”11 The British then foisted upon its pliant proxy the 1922
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The Treaty required the “employment of British officials in the Iraq
government,” with whom the Iraqi King would need to consult with on a regular basis. In
matters of economics, foreign policy, and defense, the King was required to abide by “the
advice of His Britannic Majesty tendered through the High Commissioner …” With
regards to military affairs, Iraq was required to only purchase British arms, while
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granting basing rights and the right to return for British forces.12 The terms of the Treaty
effectively rendered Iraqi independence to be an illusion.
Equally illusory was the notion that this British creation would guarantee internal
stability. As far as the Iraqi people were concerned, the system in place led to abject
poverty and repeated humiliations, such that any successful efforts to create short-term
stability would only succeed in provoking a much greater anti-colonial conflagration in
the future. By chance, that large conflagration took place at a time when the US began to
overshadow Britain as the dominant power in the Middle East, in the early days of the
Cold War. As such, it is worth recalling the struggles of the Iraqi people in an anticolonial context. Most of these struggles prior to the Cold War were overlooked by US
policymakers as irrelevant backwater events. With the emergence of the Cold War, these
struggles were viewed strictly through the lens of a monolithic communist conspiracy
fomenting discord in the third world, to the detriment of the West. With this fundamental
misunderstanding of Iraqi events, the US began its long and troubled blind stumble into
Iraq. Thus it serves to briefly recall some of the more noteworthy anti-colonial struggles
in Iraq.
While smaller-scale rebellions, protests, and riots were fairly common, there are
two developments which best highlighted the anti-colonial nature of the struggles of the
Iraqi people. The first development centered around the most unlikely of figures, King
Ghazi. The second monarch of Iraq, King Ghazi embraced pan-Arab politics, which
earned him the rare privilege of being supported by large swaths of the Iraqi people.
From his radio station, Radio Qasr al-Zuhour, Ghazi called for the annexation of Kuwait
to Iraq, and greater support to the anti-Zionist struggle in Palestine. In 1936, Ghazi lent
12
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his support to a coup led by General Bakr Sidqi which led to the overthrow of Prime
Minister Yasin al-Hashimi and exiling of a coterie of pro-British politicians.13 To the
lament of many Iraqis, Ghazi died in a car crash in April 1939. However, many Iraqis
believe that Ghazi was assassinated. The late Said Aburish pointed out inconsistencies,
such as the fact that Ghazi’s car was relatively undamaged, the fatal wound was on the
back of his head, and the refusal of the doctor who oversaw Ghazi’s autopsy to sign the
death certificate.14 Nonetheless, as the British newspaper The Guardian reported,
“Ghazi’s death solved a problem for the British who were thinking of removing him.”15
The next major effort to unseat the British from Iraq came in 1941 when politician
Rashid Ali al-Kaylani and a group of four generals known as the Golden Square launched
a coup against the regent, Prince Abdul Ilah (standing in for the 5-year old King Faisal II)
and Prime Minister Taha al-Hashimi. Deeply embittered by Ghazi’s death, the coup
plotters sought to expel the British from Iraq once and for all. For help, they turned to
Nazi Germany. However, allowing the royal family to escape into exile, failing to unseat
British forces from their last bastion at Habbaniyah air base, and the failure of the Nazis
to deliver sufficient aid in time sealed the fate of the coup. In under a month the British
invaded Iraq and unseated the Golden Square. Those who did not flee Iraq after taking
part in the coup were handed over to Abdul Ilah to do with as he pleased. The British
continued to occupy Iraq until 1947.16
For US policymakers, these events were perceived as insignificant disturbances in
a far-off backwater state. With the two interrelated issues of oil and the Cold War, the US
13
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began to take a greater interest in developments in the Middle East, including in Iraq.
Western leaders understood that cheap, easily accessible, and plentiful Middle East oil
was vital to post-World War II reconstruction and the future development of Western
economies. To this end, the US undertook several efforts, including the oil-for-security
agreement forged by US President Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz of Saudi
Arabia, reinforcing the US position in the IPC, and attempting to break the British
monopoly on Iranian oil. In light of the Cold War, the US viewed the Middle East as a
region in which the USSR needed to be denied access, and as another front for
containment. A series of documents, most notably George Kennan’s “Long Telegram”
and National Security Council Document 68 (NSC-68), touched on these issues.
According to NSC-68, the “fundamental design of the Kremlin” was “the complete
subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of
society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus
and structure subservient to and controlled by the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are
now directed towards the domination of the Eurasian land mass.”17 Thus, by implication,
the USSR had designs on the Middle East.
In order to thwart any Soviet designs in the Middle East, the US sought to
complete the encirclement of the USSR with military alliances by forming an alliance to
link the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization(SEATO). Initially, the US supported a British initiative to establish the
Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), together with France and Turkey. If the
alliance was to have any teeth, Egypt was deemed to be vitally important. Egypt was
“obviously the key” to the issues of the Middle East, said President Dwight
17
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Eisenhower.18 This owed in part to its size, position, and due to its housing of the Suez
Canal, but more importantly, due to its new, charismatic leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Having led an anti-colonial revolution against the British puppet monarchy of King
Farouk, and adopting a revolutionary, pan-Arab, and anti-imperialist stance, Nasser
appeared as the least likely candidate to join a western-led military alliance.
Despite these differences, there were some shared areas of interest which the US
hoped to exploit. Nasser’s stance on Britain was very clear, yet his stance towards the US
seemed amenable. On all sides there was a realization that Nasser’s revolution was still
young, and if it were to survive, he could ill afford to anger Britain, and the West at large.
He could not outright dismiss the west and, at least in the short term, would have to
acquiesce to its demands. Yet clearly the US was more willing to deal with Nasser than
Britain. This was made all the more easy by his very public condemnations of
communism. During the days of the United Arab Republic, Nasser passed a law which
outlawed the Communist Party.19 Bearing this in mind, the US saw in Nasser a potential
ally in keeping the region free of communism. Furthermore, there were a large number of
Arabists in the State Department and CIA who believed that close relations with the
Arabs was in the interests of the US, and that Nasser was the key.20 As the US began to
cultivate close ties to Nasser, the relationship began to hit a few snags.
The first snag came on 11 May 1953, when US Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles met Nasser in Cairo. High on Dulles’ agenda was persuading Egypt to join
MEDO. Despite promises of US pressure against Britain, and aid, Nasser was
18
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uninterested by the proposal. Nasser asked at whom the defense pact was aimed, to which
Dulles replied, the USSR. While Nasser was anti-communist out of principle, he viewed
the US claim of a Soviet threat to the Middle East as unrealistic. Nasser asked Dulles:
How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol
sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal [i.e. Israel] to worry about somebody who
is holding a knife 5,000 miles away? They would tell me first things first.21
Without Egypt, MEDO was deemed unfeasible, and was abandoned. This marked the
first step in the deterioration of relations between Egypt and the US. While the endpoint
had yet to be reached, Nasser demonstrated that he was no puppet, that would not submit
to the dictates of a foreign power on vital interests, and that Arab nationalism could not
be so easily co-opted to serve US interests. Nonetheless, the US remained determined to
create a military alliance in the Middle East. Rebuffed by Egypt, the US turned to Iraq.
Iraq was viewed as a prime candidate for a military alliance for two reasons. First,
Iraq’s economic importance increased. In the early-1950s, large new oil discoveries were
made around Basra. In order to handle the greater output of oil throughout Iraq, the Iraqi
government turned to US firms such as Bechtel and Brown & Root to construct new
pipelines.22 Second, much of Iraq’s leadership were sympathetic with US views against
communism. As historian Adeed Dawisha wrote, “Iraq was the natural choice. With the
virulent pro-Western and anti-communist [Prime Minister] Nuri at the helm, particularly
now that he had pliant Parliament and muzzled press, there would be precious few
obstacles to the passage of such a pact.”23 Iraq’s strongman Prime Minister Nuri al-Said
found common cause with America’s anti-communist mission. Within his own country,

21
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one of his greatest political rivals was the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which, as
historian Rashid Khalidi noted, was “one of the biggest and most active in the Arab
world.”24 Since its inception in 1934, the ICP had been one of the most active parties in
Iraq, boycotting British businesses, organizing unions and labor strikes, and pushing for
improvements in the lives of the Iraqi masses. In January 1948, the ICP organized its
largest strike to date. Over 3,000 oil workers rallied to demand higher wages at a
pumping station near Haditha. When the IPC (Iraq Petroleum Company, not to be
confused with the ICP) refused to meet their demands, the striking workers brought the
pumping station to a standstill. After two weeks, authorities cut off food and water
supplies to the station. After three weeks, the strikers decided to take their message to
Baghdad, in what has been dubbed “The Great March.” When the marchers entered
Fallujah, the police intervened and arrested them.25 In 1949, after the on-again off-again
Prime Minister Nuri returned to his post, he unleashed a fierce crackdown against the
ICP, ordering several of its imprisoned leaders be publicly hanged and left up for
display.26 While Nuri’s crackdown dealt a severe blow to the ICP, it did not silence it,
and the party remained active and influential until the ascendancy of the Ba’athists.
Nuri was seen as an ideal partner for the US, despite his human rights record.
From the hangings of the Golden Square coup participants to the ICP hangings, it was
perfectly clear how Nuri exercised power, yet this was not an obstacle for the US.
Dismissively, Harold Glidden, a State Department analyst wrote in 1958 that “It was

24
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generally known for some years that the regime had little popular base: this is, however,
characteristic of Arab governments.”27
Nuri did not have to be persuaded to join a western-backed military alliance.
Instead, he took the initiative. In January 1955, Iraq and Turkey entered an alliance called
the Baghdad Pact. Later in the year, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain joined as well. The US
had not joined, but pledged its support. Each country had its own political reason for
entering the Pact. Historian Charles Tripp wrote that “The pact thus served a further
purpose for Nuri al-Said: it ended the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 without committing
Iraq to enter into another bilateral agreement. Nuri thereby hoped to retain the advantages
of the alliance with Great Britain (and indeed the Western powers more generally) whilst
at the same time avoiding the uproar which had followed in the signing of the Portsmouth
Treaty in 1948.”28 For the US, the Pact connected NATO and SEATO, fully encircling
the USSR.
The Baghdad Pact also sought to contain another political force, that of Nasser’s
brand of Arab nationalism. Ever since Nasser’s rejection of Dulles’ overtures regarding
MEDO, relations between Egypt and the US began to deteriorate. In 1955, Nasser
attended the Bandung Conference, one of the first steps in creating the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM). The US was opposed to the conference because it undermined the
narrative of a world split between US-led capitalism and Soviet-led communism. This
was soon followed by Egyptian diplomatic recognition of the People's’ Republic of
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China. Non-aligned states took a stand, refused to take sides, and reaffirmed their rights
to exercise relations with whichever state they so desired. Nasser exercised that right
when, in the same year, Egypt signed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia. The
unprecedented move broke the British stranglehold over arms sales to the Middle East.
As a soldier in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Nasser saw firsthand how Arab reliance on
British arms had led to defeat, following a British Arms embargo.29 While the Czech
arms deal did not overhaul the Egyptian military into a formidable fighting force, it
nonetheless set a precedent which undermined western control over the Middle East
through arms sales. Perhaps most consequential was Nasser’s decision to nationalize the
Suez Canal. The move was prompted by the need to raise revenues for the construction of
the Aswan Dam on the Nile River. Initially, the US, Britain, and France offered financial
and technical assistance, but Egypt refused due to the conditions. Chief among those
conditions was a demand that Egypt refrain from seeking aid from the USSR and Eastern
Bloc, a condition Egypt viewed as a violation of its sovereignty. In a three-hour speech to
the nation, Nasser unleashed Operation Dignity and Glory. With the utterance of the
codeword “de Lesseps” (as in Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French engineer of the Canal),
Egyptian security forces mobilized, bringing the Suez Canal firmly under Egyptian
control.30 Despite the fact that the US came to Egypt’s rescue during the 1956 Suez War,
pressuring Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw, the honeymoon with Nasser was over.
Faced with the dual challenges of communism and Arab nationalism, the US
doubled down in its involvement in the Middle East. In January 1957, President
Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine. Under the Doctrine, any state in the
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Middle East could request economic aid, military aid, or US military intervention “to
protect and secure territorial integrity and political independence of such nations,
requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by
international communism.”31 While not explicitly stated, the threat of Arab nationalism
was included as well, as was demonstrated a year later.
In 1958, US Middle East policy was put to the test. It appeared that the worst-case
scenario was coming true. In February, the first step was taken in uniting the Arab world
into one nation when Egypt and Syria merged into the United Arab Republic (UAR).
With growing unrest throughout the Middle East, western powers were fearful that more
states would join the union. In Jordan, where much of the population was supportive of
Nasser, spurred on in part by the Egyptian radio station Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the
Arabs), there was hope that Nasser would come to their support. In 1956, under immense
popular pressure, King Hussein dismissed John Glubb, the British commander of the
Jordanian military. Later that year, after Jordan’s first parliamentary elections, Suleiman
Nabulsi was nominated by his party and by King Hussein to form a government. Nabulsi
went on an independence streak which proved too much for King Hussein and his US and
British benefactors to stomach. He proved receptive to Nasser, established diplomatic
relations with the USSR, and allowed the communist party in Jordan to operate in the
open. The following year, under pressure from his external backers, King Hussein
dismissed Nabulsi, and dissolved the Parliament.32 With the renewed confidence given to
them by Nasser, many Jordanians took to the streets, calling for Jordan to unite with the
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UAR. In the same year, Lebanon descended into civil war. In 1957, after buying his way
into power with CIA money, Camille Chamoun was elected president.33 The following
year, after trying to force through an illegal amendment to the constitution to extend his
term, Lebanon spiraled into civil war. Present among the groups fighting Chamoun were
several pro-Nasser elements, calling on the UAR to provide support.
In order to contain the growing chaos, and potential for further Nasserist
revolutions, the US gave greater military support to the Baghdad Pact, and midwived a
proposed merger between the two Hashimi kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. The aim of
supporting the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Union was to provide a counterbalance to the UAR.
First, popular support for this initiative was nearly non-existent. Even Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri acknowledged that picking up Jordan’s financial burden was unpopular
from an Iraqi standpoint.34 Nuri also pointed out that without financial assistance from
the US, and without including Kuwait, the Arab Union was not economically viable.35
US policymakers grew increasingly hopeless when they realized they had no
viable alternative to roll back the Arab nationalist tide short of direct military
intervention. Then the worst case scenario came true. On 14 July 1958, a group of
military officers led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salaam Arif
launched a coup against the Iraqi monarchy. Coups were not unheard of in Iraq, much
less the Middle East, but this one was unprecedented in its extreme violence. Qasim and
Arif heeded the lesson of of the Golden Square, and eliminated any possible successor.
As Said Aburish wrote: “To pre-empt any possibility of the monarchy being restored they
33
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made sure of murdering King Faisal II, Ghazi’s son, towards whom the people felt
affection because of his father. Killing a son to avenge the father’s assassination was an
ironic act of Shakespearean dimensions.”36
The military finally got its revenge for Ghazi’s murder, for the Golden Square
executions, and for its humiliating defeat in Palestine in 1948. What was even more
frightening was the popular outpouring in the Iraqi streets. After decades of subjugation,
humiliation, and abject poverty, the reaction of the Iraqi people was unrestrained. The
Iraqi people were very supportive of the coup, and were eager to take matters into their
own hands as well. After his execution by the military, the body of the hated regent
Prince Abdul Ilah was claimed by a mob, dragged through the streets, dismembered, and
hung up in front of the Ministry of Defense.37 Prime Minister Nuri was caught trying to
flee Baghdad, disguised beneath an abaya. Said Aburish provided an account of what
followed:
Dressed as a woman, he feebly tried to face them with a pistol. They killed him,
ran their cars back and forth over his body, buried him, then disinterred him and
tore what remained into small scraps. His fingers and other parts of his body were
paraded by people in the matter of a football trophy.38
Angry mobs proceeded to storm the Baghdad Hotel. Among the victims killed were a
group of Jordanian officials dispatched to Baghdad to discuss the formation of the Arab
Union. With their deaths, any hopes of creating a local counterbalance to the UAR were
forever dashed. Qasim and Arif did not condone such spectacles of violence, but nor
could they stop it, for such was the anger of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people had gotten
their revenge.
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The 1958 coup sent US policymakers into a panic. Eisenhower remarked that
“This somber turn of events could, without vigorous response on our part, result in a
complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East.”39 Secretary of State
Dulles said that “Iraq today is the most dangerous spot on earth.”40 Every political
element in Iraq that had been opposed to the monarchy, including communists and
Nasserists, came into the open. The US believed that another Nasserist coup had just
unfolded. Nasser did little to alleviate this fear. In fact, he was supportive of the coup,
and believed its leaders would move to join the UAR. Shortly after the coup, he flew to
Syria, and gave a speech at Aleppo in support of the Iraqi coup. He took the additional
step of stationing a squadron of Egyptian Mig jets in Syria to deter any attempt at
thwarting the coup.41 Surrounded from both sides by Nasserist states, so the US believed,
Lebanon and Jordan would fall imminently as well, and it was felt that military
intervention might be necessary. The next escalation in the crisis was the US military
deployment in Lebanon, and British deployment in Jordan.
Fearing that an Iraq-style coup was about to happen in his country, or so he told
the US, Lebanese President Camille Chamoun evoked the Eisenhower Doctrine.
Motivated more by seeking external support to prop up his tenuous rule in a midst of a
civil than of a Nasserist takeover, Chamoun promptly demanded US military
intervention, as well as the entry of the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean within 48

39

William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II (Monroe:
Common Courage Press, 2004), 94
40 Said Aburish, A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1997), 135
41 Adel Darwish & Gregory Alexander, Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam’s War
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 19

19

hours.42 The US obliged, and deployed over 14,000 Marines to Beirut. In Jordan, King
Hussein claimed to have discovered a coup plot within the army, organized by pro-Syrian
and pro-Egyptian elements.43 After arresting over 40 officers, King Hussein requested
British military intervention to shore up his rule. Hussein was especially fearful after
watching his royal cousins in Iraq executed.
At the very minimum, the Anglo-American intervention was aimed at preventing
the fall of Jordan and Lebanon. In the worst-case scenario, it looked as if the US and
Britain were ready to strike Iraq. Indeed, invasion of Iraq was considered. Israel’s Prime
Minister David Ben Gurion stated that if Turkey and Iran received US backing, the Iraqi
revolution could be crushed.44 In a cable to US ambassador to Iraq, Walter John Gallman,
it was suggested that the US Marines in Beirut “might be used to loyal Iraqi troops to
counter-attack.” However, Gallman continued, “No one in Iraq could be found in Iraq to
collaborate with. Everybody was for the revolution.”45 Not only did an invasion of Iraq
seem imminent, but so did a wider conflagration throughout the region.
Soon after, several events brought about a diffusion of the crisis. In Baghdad,
after a protracted argument with Arif, Qasim emerged on top. Arif was sympathetic to
Nasser, and wanted to join Iraq to the UAR, while Qasim maintained an Iraq-first policy,
and objected. Arif is said to have offered Nasser to kill Qasim, yet Nasser advised against
this move. Qasim then moved to alleviate western fears. In a meeting with British
Ambassador Michael Wright, Qasim assured the ambassador that the revolution was a
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purely internal matter, and that Iraq had no intention of joining the UAR. He said that
Iraq would not interrupt the flow of oil, or interfere with foreign business interests, and
that there was no need to launch an attack from Lebanon and Jordan.46
In the US, cooler heads prevailed. The State Department urged caution, stating “in
our opinion any move by force from the outside into Iraq would meet with very little
Iraqi support and its success would be highly unlikely. Furthermore, since the signing of
the Mutual Defense Agreement yesterday, Nasser and the Syrians would promptly come
to the aid of the Republic of Iraq.”47 Further reports followed, giving the US more
optimism:
Reports reaching us from Baghdad indicate that the new regime in Iraq (1) desires
friendly relations with the West, (2) will maintain existing international
agreements, (3) at least for the time being will retain membership in the Baghdad
Pact, (4) will not nationalize the production of oil, (5) recognizes the UAR but is
not joining.
Although the new government came to power in an extremely bloody and
completely illegal way, there can be no doubt that its popular support is far
broader than that behind King Faisal. Furthermore, although the Republic of Iraq
has indicated its plans to establish relations with the Soviet Union and other
communist countries, Communist influence in the government appears so far to
be limited48
The final reassurance came from a meeting between Qasim and Ambassador Gallman in
Baghdad. Qassim reiterated the points documented above, and told the ambassador “We
Iraqis want to be friends with the US.”49 With that, the crisis was diffused, for the time
being at least.
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Tensions soon flared up once again, slowly but surely. Despite Qasim’s
assurances that Iraq wished to maintain good relations with the US, the offices of the
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and US Information Services (USIS)
remained closed and inaccessible to US personnel.50 US policymakers spoke among
themselves of the increasing power of the communists. Qasim made clear his intent not to
hand Iraq to the UAR, resulting in a bitter feud with Nasser. On this point, the US was
reassured, but on Qasim allowing communists to operate openly and accepting their
support, the US grew weary. Some analyses were more forgiving, with one stating that
“Kassem must accept some communist support or stand alone against Nasser.”51 In
another, more pessimistic analysis, Qasim was “the doop or the willing tool of the
communists”, or was too fearful of launching a crackdown and risking being
overthrown.52 The ICP was seen as a ticking time bomb. According to a February 1959
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), the ICP favoured a slow creep to power,
as opposed to a sudden coup.53
The danger of a communist takeover was more than an abstract matter of politics
and ideology. Buried beneath the jargon of fighting communism, US interests in Iraq
were very clear. According to a State Department memorandum, “The principal Western

“Operational Guidance Concerning Iraq”, US Department of State Office of the Historian, 18
February 1959, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d162.
51 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 392d Meeting of the National Security Council”, US
Department of State Office of the Historian, 23 December 1958,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d155.
52 “Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
(Rountree) to Acting Secretary of State Dillon”, US Department of State Office of the Historian, 22
December 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d154.
53 “Special National Intelligence Estimate: The Communist Threat to Iraq”, US Department of
State Office of the Historian, 17 February 1959,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d161.
50

22

interest in Iraq (apart from denying the area to the USSR) is oil.”54 As with many
nationalist revolutions, there was a lingering fear of resource nationalization. This fear
had prompted the US to engage in covert operations against leaders such as Muhammad
Mossadegh of Iran and Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala. Even measures short of
nationalization, such as simply demanding better terms under existing agreements, were
anathema to the US. It was this potential scenario in Iraq which worried the US. As was
stated in the 1959 SNIE:
A Communist-controlled Iraq would also threaten Western access to Middle
Eastern oil. Although we estimate that such a government might initially prove
fairly reasonable with permitting continued Western access to Iraqi oil - in the
interests of receiving continued revenue and of avoiding drastic Western response
- it would at a minimum insist on substantial modifications in the terms and
conditions under which Iraqi oil flows to the West. In any case the future of the
Iraq Petroleum Company would be unpromising indeed - with ultimate
nationalization likely.55
Indeed, events appeared to be moving in this direction, fitting neatly into US
predictions. In late-1958, the USSR signed its first ever arms deal with Iraq.56 In
February 1959, after the resignation of six ministers, Qasim appointed six communist
replacements.57 For the US, the final straw came in March, when Iraq withdrew from the
Baghdad Pact. Deprived of its founding member, the Pact was geographically divided in
half, and renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
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With Iraq acting too independently of Western interests, the US sought out a
strategy to contain and undermine Iraq, and even contemplated alternatives to Qasim.
Among the elements identified as possible alternatives included nationalists, Baathists,
and military officers.58 Events in Iraq had led the US to shift its attention from the UAR
to Iraq. Faced with a convergence of interests, Nasser and the US agreed to engage in
limited cooperation to contain, if not undermine and usurp Qasim. “Nasser is the only
acceptable source of outside support left to Iraqi Nationalist elements who may wish to
move against the present regime,” read a State Department policy paper. It continued:
“Any accomodation with Iraq would, therefore, have to be in the nature of a limited
experiment.”59 Nasser was more than happy to oblige.
In 1960, despite the trials and tribulations, and several violent conflagrations,
Qasim was firmly in power. Part of this can be attributed to the broad support for Qasim
from the Iraqi people. Unlike previous Iraqi rulers, Qasim tried, and in many cases
succeeded in bringing improvement to the lives of ordinary Iraqis. Two weeks after
toppling the monarchy, the Republican government abolished the Tribal Criminal and
Civil Disputes Regulation, breaking the grip of the feudal tribal sheikhs over the rural
population. Shortly after, Qasim implemented sweeping land reforms, putting a ceiling on
individual land ownership, and launching a land redistribution campaign. By 1966,
Qasim’s land reform program granted land to over 300,000 families, many of whom had
previously been landless and/or working as sharecroppers.60 In 1960, in order to curb the
explosion of slums in Baghdad, Qasim ordered the construction of Madinat al-Thawra
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(Revolution City) in the suburbs of Baghdad. Over 25,000 units of affordable housing
were constructed, together with schools and hospitals, giving many of Baghdad’s poorest
inhabitants access to running water and plumbing, electricity, medical facilities, and
schooling.61 In order to continue the momentum of reforms, the Iraqi state had to obtain
more money. To do so, it would demand greater say in the production and sale of its
largest resource: oil.
Qasim’s first move was to lend support to a multinational initiative to give oil
producing states greater control over their oil reserves. In 1960, Venezuela and Saudi
Arabia explored the option of forming a cartel with other oil-producing states. Qasim
supported the initiative, and hosted a meeting in September in Baghdad to discuss the
matter. Iran and Kuwait were also in attendance. The Venezuelan delegation put forth a
proposal, and all members voted unanimously, creating the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC).62
Qasim’s next, more ambitious effort, was to bring Kuwait back under Iraqi
control. Like King Ghazi and Nuri al-Said before him, Qasim revived Iraq’s claim to
Kuwait. In 1899, Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah, the emir of Kuwait, signed a treaty with
Britain, making Kuwait into a British protectorate. In 1961, Britain granted independence
to Kuwait, withdrawing its forces from the newly-independent emirate. In the absence of
the British, Qasim saw an opportune moment to revive Iraqi claims to Kuwait. At a 25
June press conference, Qasim made an offer to “liberate” Kuwait, claiming that Kuwait
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was “an indivisible part of Iraq” and “it is the Iraqi Republic and no one else which signs
agreements for Kuwait.”63
Amid the Kuwait crisis, Qasim took the additional step of partially nationalizing
the IPC. With the passing of Law 80, all IPC concession territories not being exploited
were put under the control of the state, while existing areas of production were to remain
under IPC control. Qasim realized that full nationalization would lead to a shutdown of
oil production, and thus sought to tread a fine line between state and popular demand for
greater control of oil, and not fully alienating the companies of the IPC.64 The US reacted
with hostility, charging Qasim with a “unilateral violation of a major economic
arrangement with Iraq.”65
The US opposed the partial IPC nationalization for two reasons. First, the US
consortium in the IPC still held the original 23.75 percent share first agreed upon in 1921,
and intended to extract as much value as possible from its concession. Second, the threat
to US interests posed by partial nationalization would have been magnified if Qasim were
to successfully annex Kuwait and its enormous oil reserves. “If he can add Kuwait
production (largest in ME) to that of IPC,” warned National Security Council advisor
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Robert Komer, “he’ll have stranglehold on ME oil.”66 To have one state have the ability
to rival pro-US oil producers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, was deemed unacceptable.
On the Kuwaiti front, the Iraqi military amassed in force along the border. It
appeared that an invasion was imminent. Were an invasion to take place, it would be over
in a matter of hours. The US was alarmed by the escalating crisis, but was unwilling to
intervene. The most it was willing to do was to conduct reconnaissance on Iraqi maritime
activity. “The reason for this,” read a State Department memorandum, “is that there are
twelve motor torpedo boats, some with partly Russian crews, at Basra at the moment and
reports of Iraqi troops being sent to Fao which may indicate the intention of the Iraqis to
on some maritime adventure.”67 Potential conflict with the USSR was not a risk US
policymakers were willing to take. The British, however, were undeterred, and
immediately redeployed to Kuwait.68
With the US hesitant to intervene, and the British too eager to intervene, it was
the Arabs who played the decisive role in bringing the crisis to an end, most notably
Nasser. Qasim hoped that by standing up to the British, he would enjoy widespread
support from the Arab world. Quite unexpectedly and ironically, Qasim was met by
condemnation from other Arab governments, especially from Nasser. Just as Qasim
dashed Nasser’s dream of expanding the UAR into Iraq, so would Nasser dash Qasim’s
hope of annexing Kuwait. Nasser was to do so by supporting Kuwait’s successful bid to
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join the Arab League, which was to condemn Qasim. On 20 July, the Arab League passed
a 5-point Saudi-proposed resolution calling for Iraq to cease its threats and belligerency,
for League members to support Kuwaiti entry, for a British military withdrawal, and for
the deployment of an Arab League peacekeeping force to Kuwait.69 Facing Arab League
condemnation, and the deployment of a peacekeeping force manned largely by Egyptians
right under Iraq’s nose, Qasim realized he was almost completely isolated, and backed
down. With the British withdrawal and replacement with an Arab League peacekeeping
force, the threat of war receded.
After Qasim backed down, the US doomsday scenario of an Iraqi “stranglehold
on ME oil” did not come to fruition. Nonetheless, under Qasim, there existed a powerful
countercurrent to oil producers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia which, despite their
membership in OPEC, remained generally accommodating to the US and its demand for
low oil prices. Additionally, were Qasim’s project to have progressed even further and
been successful, it could set a precedent for other states to follow. Partial nationalization,
it was feared, was a stepping stone to full nationalization. With US-Iraq relations at their
lowest, if not lower than during the 1958 revolution, the US was eager to see Qasim
replaced.
What remains unclear is to what extent the US worked toward replacing Qasim.
Several academics and journalists, including Hugh Wilford, Tim Weiner, and Said
Aburish, allege that in February 1960, the CIA engaged in a botched effort to assassinate
Qasim. The source of this allegation is the 1975 Senate Select Committee report Alleged
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, which made mention of “a ‘special
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operation’ to ‘incapacitate’ an Iraqi colonel believed to be “promoting Soviet bloc
political interests in Iraq.”70 Many have interpreted this as an attempt to assassinate
Qasim. However, Qasim held the rank of brigadier, not colonel. Whether this was a
recording error, or whether this was a reference to another Iraqi official or to Qasim
remains to be seen.
What is clear is that the US was exploring possible candidates to replace Qasim.
One of the candidates the US took note of was the Iraqi branch of the Arab Socialist
Ba'ath Party. On its face, this would appear to be an unlikely partnership, with Arab
nationalism and socialism being anathema to the US. However, there were some common
interests, namely hostility towards Qasim and his communist supporters. This fact was
duly noted in a State Department document which identified the Ba’ath Party as a likely
source of opposition to Qasim’s cabinet reshuffle and appointment of communists.71 This
opposition was best demonstrated on 7 October 1959, when a Ba'ath hit squad which
included a young Saddam Hussein ambushed Qasim on his commute through Baghdad.
By almost all accounts, the assassination attempt was a dismal failure. Qasim survived
the ambush despite two bullet wounds in the arm and shoulder. Several Ba'athists were
killed or wounded, likely due to the crossfire from their fellow gunmen.
Despite their initial failure, the Ba'ath made another attempt to come to power.
Unable to topple Qasim on their own, the Ba'ath entered into an uneasy alliance with
Nasserists, Iraqi nationalists, and military leaders. On 8 November 1963, this alliance
formed a cabal and launched a coup. Leading the coup was Qasim’s former protege Arif,
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who was spared from a death sentence and released in 1961. As was expected by the
coup plotters, the coup was met with immediate resistance in the streets, from
communists and non-communists. With Qasim’s government under siege, his most
fervent supporters demanded to be armed. Despite the dire situation, Qasim refused to
arm civilians and put them in harm’s way. Despite Qasim’s capture, resistance in the
streets continued. The new junta determined that if the resistance was to be crushed,
Qasim would need to be executed. Thus, Qasim was taken to a studio in Baghdad for trial
and execution. Qasim refused to play along with the charade of this kangaroo court.
Before being executed, Qasim shouted “long live the Iraqi people!”72 The execution was
broadcast on a loop throughout the day, in order to eliminate any doubt among Qasim’s
supporters that he was dead. In order to consolidate its gains and root out communists and
other opposition, the Arif junta unleashed the Ba’athists, who embarked on a series of
purges, kidnappings, death squads, and public executions. Among the participants of the
repressions was Saddam. Said Aburish details what transpired:
Saddam Hussein, who had rushed back to Iraq from exile in Cairo to join the
victors, was personally involved in the torture of leftists in the separate detention
centres for the fellaheen or peasants, and the muthaqafeen, or educated class. And,
tellingly, the eliminations were done mainly on an individual basis, house-tohouse visits by hit squads who knew where their victims were and carried out onthe-spot executions. This explains the killing of seven out of the thirteen-man
Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party - most after they were hideously
tortured. The British Committee for Human Rights in Iraq, one of the few
international groups to investigate what happened after the coup, confirmed all
this in a 1964 report and compared the Ba’athist hit squads to ‘Hitlerian shock
troops’.73
For the US, the coup was a welcome development. According to Richard Murphy,
a former diplomat and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
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affairs, “The fact that there had been an enormously bloody put-down of the communists
in Baghdad was surely welcome news in Washington.”74 What remains to be seen is to
what extent the coup was influenced by US covert action. While the US did desire for
Qasim to be overthrown, there is little in the way of declassified documents which shed
any light on the US role in the 1963 coup. Clearly, the US had an interest in the coup
succeeding. As it unfolded, the CIA and State Department judged that “if the coup is
successful, relations between the U.S. and Iraq will be considerably improved.”75 While
this does not prove the US played a central role in the coup, several sources are adamant
that the US was deeply involved. According to James Akins, a former US diplomat
stationed in Baghdad from 1961 to 1965:
Personally, I considered it a real triumph of the CIA. They didn’t have very many
of them, there were alot of coup attempts that had gone sour, but this one worked
and it was for a good cause. I think it was a very good thing that happened.76
Roger Morris, a former White House advisor, stated:
There was a major involvement in the 1963 coup, and arms were flown
clandestinely from Turkey. A lot of money, a lot of financial support, CIA
planning was involved in the early stages of the coup. Now the Ba’ath was, of
course, extremely eager to take power, but they did need American help.77
On the Iraqi side, former Ba’ath interior minister Ali Saleh al-Saadi remarked “We came
to power on a CIA train.”78 In the absence of declassified material on the subject, and
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with only public statements from former US officials, what role the US played in the
1963 coup remains an open question.
Questions of CIA complicity notwithstanding, relations between the US and Arif
junta began amicably. Early assessments of the new government were optimistic. With
Qasim out of the way, and Nasser at odds with the US over the civil war in Yemen, the
new Iraqi government “[set] up a new power pole in the Arab world in fact competing
with Nasser.”79 Most importantly, with Ba’athist doctrine calling for a mixed economy,
“there is a wide scope for private enterprise.”80 The US was very eager to get back to
business, and took a number of steps to ensure the consolidation of the new government.
One such step was a series of arms sales. For fiscal year 1964, the US approved the sale
of 40 light tanks, 12 tank transporters, 500 heavy trucks, 15 large helicopters, 5 F-86
fighter aircraft, and 13 howitzers.81 The aim of the sales was two-fold. The first was to
revive western arms sales to Iraq, previously severed under Qasim, and “with the ultimate
objective of having Iraq, and hopefully Syria, look to the West as the primary source for
necessary armaments.”82 The second was to assist the Iraqi state suppress the most recent
Kurdish rebellion. Although it was not openly acknowledged to be the goal by US
policymakers, what was acknowledged was that Iraq’s most pressing military concern at
the time was the Kurdish rebellion.83 Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated
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the Kurds to object to US arms sales, yet it was determined that “it’s more important to
be responsive to the new regime.”84
On the business front, the US encouraged its companies to resume business in
Iraq.85 “In particular,’ read a State Department report, “US businessmen should be
encouraged to seek opportunities in Iraq,” which was “the second most populous and
potentially powerful state in the Eastern Arab world after the UAR, and has a viable
economy.”86Additionally, the US began delivering food and agriculture aid via Public
Law 480 (PL 480).87
Before the year was over, new developments would cast doubt on earlier
optimistic assessments of the new Iraqi government. Ten months after the coup,
prompted in part by the Ba’athist streak of violence, and internal power struggles, the
military faction under Colonel Arif sidelined the Ba’ath. Some Ba’athists were exiled,
while others, like Saddam Hussein, were arrested. Arif assumed power for himself, and
the Ba’ath were driven underground once more. With Arif, “a supporter of Nasser”,
leading Iraq, the US feared a “resurgence of Nasser’s influence in the Arab world.”88
Making matters worse was Arif's overtures to the USSR. Although Iraq
maintained a non-aligned posture, and maintained closer relations with the US after
Qasim’s fall, Arif sought closer relations with the USSR. Arif’s Prime Minister, Subhi
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Abdul Hamed, suggested that he do so through Nasser. In May of 1964, the opportunity
presented itself. Arif was invited to commencement ceremonies commemorating the
beginning of construction on the Aswan Dam. Also in attendance was Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev. Prime Minister Hamed organized the first meeting between Arif and
Khrushchev. After this meeting, Hamed explained:
Iraqi delegations started going to Moscow to ratify new agreements. That’s when
the Americans felt that they were about to lose Iraq for good. We favored the
Soviet Union over the United States.89
As Soviet-Iraqi ties expanded, US-Iraq relations hit a new low in 1967. In protest
to US support for Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Iraq severed diplomatic
relations with the US.90 In a report of a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan
Pachachi, a US diplomat paraphrased Pachachi as having said:
He noted that in the Suez crisis of 1956 the United States had immediately and
forcibly publicly stated that Israel would not be allowed any territorial gains. This
time the United States had not done the same thing and had shown an utter lack of
concern for the Arabs or considerations for their feelings.91
Once more, the US and Iraq became estranged. Although the US was content to
see Qasim executed, the changes which followed were not entirely to their liking. With
US policy during the most recent Arab-Israeli War, relations hit a low point. However,
this rift would not last long. New regional developments slowly brought the US and Iraq
closer together. A new phase in US-Iraq relations was beginning.
In this first phase of relations, the US developed a flawed framework for dealing
with Iraq, one which would last for the duration of the relationship. US interests were
clear enough: to keep Iraqi oil flowing, and to keep communism out. In the interests of
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US global power, and in the midst of the Cold War, the US believed it could influence
and manipulate Iraq as it saw fit. Very much like their British colonial predecessors, the
US adopted a divide-and-conquer strategy, believing it could to so in a controlled
manner. With the growing rift between the Arif government and the US, it should have
been abundantly clear that there were limits to US power in Iraq. Instead, what unfolded
was a paradoxical phenomenon: the more the US tried to exert control over events in
Iraq, the more unstable the situation became.

The Cynical Enterprise: The Rise of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party
1968 marked a turning point in US-Iraq relations. Despite their deep misgivings
about each other, the US and Iraq became increasingly reliant on each other as a means to
achieve their respective goals. In July of that year, the Ba'ath regrouped and launched a
coup, claiming sole power over Iraq. With Egypt's fall from grace following its defeat in
the 1967 War, and Nasser's death in 1970, the Iraqi Ba'ath saw an opening to claim the
supreme leadership role in the Arab world. In order to do so, Iraq embarked on an
ambitious civilian and military modernization program, one which could be used to rally
the Arab world behind the US. To launch this program, Iraq needed the input of the West,
especially the US. In order to contain regional threats such as communism, the US
needed Iraq. Although this new phase got off to a rough start, the relationship grew to the
point that US policymakers spoke of a tilt toward Iraq. In the course of this uneasy
alliance, the US engaged in a series of short-sighted and detrimental policies which led to
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction in the Middle East, and destabilization of the region.
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The tacit alliance which emerged between the US and Iraq was not an alliance in
the traditional sense, but rather an alliance of convenience. Founded in Syria in 1947 by
Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, the Ba'ath Party developed a syncretic ideology
combining pan-Arab nationalism with socialism and anti-imperialism. The Party utilized
slogans such as "One Arab nation with an eternal mission," and "Unity, Liberty,
Socialism." All of these ideologies were anathema to the US. However, the Ba'ath had a
propensity for ruthlessness and violence, best explained by Aflaq: "When we are cruel to
others, we know that our cruelty is meant to bring them back to their true selves."92 These
qualities were valued by the US when it came to containing threats such as communism
or the spread of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. As journalist Adel Darwish
reported, the US viewed Ba'athists such as Saddam as "our man that we can actually use,
he will be absolutely and totally ruthless."93 Only as regional developments brought the
two states together could the US harness this ruthlessness.
On 17 July 1968, the Ba’athists launched their comeback, when Ba’athist officers
within the Iraqi military launched a coup. By all accounts, the coup itself was swift and
bloodless. Unlike past Iraqi coups, the deposed leader was allowed to live. President Abd
al-Rahman Arif was surrounded, and did not bother to fight back. Instead of killing Arif,
the Ba’athists demanded that he surrender power and enter exile in London. The task of
announcing the plotters’ intentions to Arif fell on General Hardan al-Tikriti. After a few
words of protest, Arif accepted the plotters’ demands, but on the condition that he be
allowed to have a last cup of tea with his deposer.94 Soon after, the Ba’athists established
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) as the supreme ruling body of the Iraqi
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state, and appointed Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as chairman. In turn, Bakr appointed his
cousin Saddam Hussein as vice chairman.95
With his appointment to vice chairman of the RCC, Saddam set out to consolidate
the power of the new government through a reign of terror. As historian Adeed Dawisha
explained:
As an Admirer of Joseph Stalin, Husayn well realized the value of the infamous
1930s purges to the longevity of the Soviet dictator’s absolutist rule. Matching
Stalin’s ruthlessness and manipulative acumen, he spent the first two years
consolidating his hold on power by promoting to positions of influence in the
party and the security organizations men who were loyal to him personally, and
eliminating potential rivals by uncovering real and imagined plots against the
government.96
In one particularly gruesome and well-publicized episode, Saddam was to apply the
lessons of Stalin with a show trial of his own. In December 1968, the government
announced it had arrested 30 men which it claimed had been spying for Israel. Saddam
turned the episode into a public spectacle, filling the newspapers, airwaves, and
televisions with news from the show trials. The trials lasted until January 1969, when
fourteen of the suspected thirty were sentenced to death, and publicly hanged at
Liberation Square. The bodies were left suspended for over a day, with radio broadcasts
in Baghdad urging the public to witness firsthand “what happens to enemies of the
revolution.”97
Initially, the US was at a loss as to how to react to the new regime. What was
clear from the beginning is that Saddam was increasingly becoming the real power
behind President Bakr. As vice president, Saddam was given wide authorities to appoint
officials within many of Iraq’s ministries, which he exploited by slowly filling with his
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loyal confidants. According to former CIA analyst Stephen Pelletiere, “we knew of
course from ‘68 on that he was the real power behind the throne, but we didn’t attach any
particular significance to him apart that he was a very ruthless guy, very tough.”98
Despite his ruthlessness, Saddam was also very pragmatic. According to former CIA
analyst Judith Yaphe:
There was a time through the early ‘70s when Saddam is a very visible presence
to the kind of modernization and Westernization that many Iraqis were hoping
for. He wore western suits, he talked about education, modernization, bringing in
the West.99
By contrast, Said Aburish described Saddam's push for modernization as "to drag Iraq
into the 20th century by its hairs, kicking and screaming."100
When it came to the Cold War divide, the Bakr-Saddam duo skillfully exploited
the animosity between the two superpowers, playing both off of each other to extract as
much aid as possible, on the best terms as possible. US policymakers effectively failed to
devise a policy for the new government. US diplomat Richard Murphy stated that in
debating whether or not to develop cordial or hostile relations, “at least superficially, it
looks like we floated back and forth.”101 Similarly, in the coming years, the US pursued
contradictory hostile and cordial policies simultaneously, further reflecting the lack of a
well-thought out policy.
Initially it seemed that US attitudes towards the Ba’athists was more hostile than
cordial. On the one hand, many policymakers and analysts recognized that Saddam’s
anti-western rhetoric was in large part aimed at a domestic audience, and that in reality he
was more than willing to deal with the West. On the other hand, more skeptical
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policymakers pointed out that whatever Saddam’s intentions, Iraq maintained closer
relations with the USSR. In 1968, for example, Iraq turned to the USSR for two projects:
the development of the North Rumelia oil field, one of the largest in Iraq, and
construction of a deep-water port at Um Qasr.102 For pessimists, most notably Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger, the final indicator of Iraq’s stance came in 1972, when Saddam
and Bakr met Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin and signed the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation, paving the way for greater economic and military
cooperation. Perhaps the most alarming element of the treaty was the provision granting
the Soviet Navy ships port call rights at Um Qasr in the Persian Gulf.103 As US energy
dependency in the Persian Gulf grew, it increasingly sought to become the dominant
power in the Gulf. With a Soviet toehold in the Gulf, the US lashed out at Iraq.
The US was not the only country to notice. Iran and Israel duly noted Iraq’s
seemingly growing tilt toward the USSR. According to historian and analyst Trita Parsi,
“Iraq’s power was still rising, and Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv viewed Baghdad’s
pro-Soviet tilt, anti-Iranian orientation, and pan-Arab tendencies with great concern.”104
Just as Iraq signed a Friendship Treaty with the Soviets, the same year, Bakr and Saddam
revived the unresolved issue of oil nationalization, first addressed by Qasim. Under
Qasim, only areas which were not being exploited were nationalized, leaving existing
areas of production to the Iraq Petroleum Company. Furthermore, many aspects of
Qasim’s program had yet to be implemented, and the Iraq Petroleum Company remained
as a powerful force. When negotiations with the IPC did not produce the desired result,
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Saddam and Bakr moved to completely nationalize the Iraqi oil industry. The IPC was
abolished and replaced by the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), an entity which was
placed under the control of the state. According to historian Charles Tripp:
Iraq was now well-placed to derive full benefit from the massive rises in oil prices
which were to follow the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. These were also to place
unimaginable wealth in the in the hands of a small circle of men who controlled
the Iraqi state, providing them with a means of patronage that far exceeded
anything available to their predecessors.105
The US policy debate remained confused, yet it had already been decided to
pressure and punish Iraq. The prospect of a powerful, centralized state with full control
over its most abundant natural resource, a pan-Arab orientation (albeit a lesser form
where individual Arab states rally behind a powerful vanguard state) and pro-Soviet tilt
was viewed as a threat. This analysis, as will be demonstrated later, was fundamentally
flawed. Saddam was more than willing to do business with the West, and in fact wanted
to reduce Iraqi dependency on the USSR. However, amid the debate in US policy circles,
the pessimist camp led by Kissinger concluded that Iraq had strayed too far, and had to be
pressured and pushed closer back to the West. In order to do so, the US joined Iran and
Israel in rousing the Iraqi Kurds into rebellion.
To launch the covert operation, Israel, Iran, and the US turned to Mullah Mustafa
Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the most powerful political
faction in Iraqi Kurdistan. For the US and Iran, the Marxist, Soviet-connected Barzani
made for an odd partner. During World War II, the USSR and Britain invaded Iran to
depose the pro-German Shah and secure the flow of Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR.
Immediately after the war, the USSR was reluctant to leave, and backed Barzani’s effort
to carve out an independent Marxist enclave in northwest Iran called the Mahabad
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Republic. Stalin hoped to use Mahabad as a buffer, as well as to prospect and exploit its
oil.106 This, and the Soviet refusal to withdraw from Iran led to a standoff with the US
and Britain, in which the USSR backed down. After Mahabad was crushed by Iranian
forces, Barzani fled to the USSR, where he resided until eventually settling in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Now, despite his reputation as a “Red Mullah”, Barzani found himself in the
embrace of the US. In May of 1972, after a visit to Moscow, President Richard Nixon
and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stopped in Tehran on the way home. Among the
topics discussed with the Shah was support for a Kurdish insurrection, which began
shortly afterwards.107
Of course, no party involved genuinely wanted the Iraqi Kurds to establish an
autonomous state. For the Shah, supporting the Kurds was a game with fire. A successful
attempt to establish an autonomous state in Iraqi Kurdistan could set an example for
Iranian Kurds to follow. Nor did the US want to see such a development take place.
According to the final report of the 1975 House Select Committee on Intelligence
(commonly known as the Pike Committee), the US aim was only to pressure Iraq and
stretch its resources thin. Citing a CIA document, the Pike Committee reported:
We would think that Iran would not look with favor on the establishment of a
formalized autonomous government. Iran, like ourselves, has seen benefit in a
stalemate situation … in which Iraq is intrinsically weakened by the Kurds’
refusal to relinquish semi-autonomy. Neither Iran nor ourselves wish to see the
matter resolved one way or the other.
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The Pike Report added to this by saying “this policy was not imparted to our clients, who
were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert action, ours was a
cynical enterprise.”108
Thus, the Kurdish insurgency dragged on, with no decisive victories between the
KDP or the Iraqi government. When the 1973 Arab-Israeli War erupted, and Iraq
deployed to the Syrian front, the Kurds saw an opportunity to launch a major offensive.
Israel advised the Kurds to follow through, but the US objected, stating “we do not repeat
not consider it advisable for you to undertake the offensive military actions that Israel has
suggested to you.”109
In 1975, the unexpected happened. On the sidelines of the 1975 OPEC summit in
Algiers, the Shah pulled the rug out from under the feet of the Kurds, Israelis, and the
US, by sitting down with Saddam. The Shah determined that he had put sufficient
pressure on Iraq, and that the time was ripe for negotiations. Saddam agreed upon
demarcating the Shatt al-Arab waterway along the thalweg (deepest point), thereby
resolving the original dispute between Iran and Iraq. With the signing of the Algiers
Accords, Iran ceased its support of the Iraqi Kurds. The agreement came as a shock to the
US and Israel, none of which had been consulted by the Shah beforehand.
Now in a desperate situation, the Kurds pleaded to the CIA for help:
There is confusion and dismay among our forces and people. Our people’s fate is
in unprecedented danger. Complete destruction hanging over our head. No
explanation for all this. We appeal to you and USG [United States Government]
intervene according to your promises.110
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No help was forthcoming. The US left the fate of the Kurds to the Iraqi military. The Pike
Report detailed what followed:
Over 200,000 refugees managed to escape into Iran. Once there, however, neither
the United States nor Iran extended adequate humanitarian assistance. In fact, Iran
was later to forcibly return over 40,000 of the refugees and the United States
government refused even one refugee into the United States by way of political
asylum even though they qualified for such assistance.111
When questioned about this duplicity, Kissinger said “covert action should not be
confused with missionary work.”112
The entire endeavor of rousing the Kurds proved to be entirely unnecessary as far
as US objectives were concerned. Although Iraq enjoyed close relations with the USSR,
it was by no means solely loyal to the Soviets, and was more than willing to work with
the West. After the Arab members of OPEC launched an oil embargo in protest of US
support for Israel during the 1973 war, global oil prices quadrupled, and Iraq found itself
flooded with record-breaking levels of oil revenue. This flood of revenue enabled
Saddam to finance his envisioned overhaul of Iraq, and created a veritable business
bonanza for foreign companies. By rousing the Kurds, the US restricted and
disadvantaged its own presence in the Iraqi market, to the benefit of its western European
allies. As Saddam explained to a group of Arab journalists in 1974:
We have no fear of dealing with any state in the world, with the exception
of the Zionist entity which we do not consider as a state and with whom we have
no intention of cooperating, ever. The severing of diplomatic relations with the
United States of America [after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War] was a political attitude
based on principle … But we have no reservations about dealing with companies
anywhere around the world, on the basis that guarantees respect of our
sovereignty and ensures both parties a legitimate profit.
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Our country has large-scale projects, prodigious projects, and we have
great ambitions. The idea that we might isolate ourselves from the world to live
according to our own devices is foreign to us, and we refuse it categorically.
Iraq today has contracts with American and West European companies.
We are cooperating with numerous Western states, and with all the Socialist
states, without exception.113
It should be noted that in June 1972, a mere two months after signing a treaty with
the Soviets, Saddam flew to Paris and conducted a series of arms deals with France.114 As
much as the US was concerned about growing Iraqi-Soviet ties, the French arms deals
proved that Iraq was far from a Soviet puppet. As was the case under Qasim, where even
the most basic revision of terms within existing agreements on oil production were
viewed unfavorably, the US viewed Iraqi relations with the USSR in terms of a zero sum
game. Although US companies were already present in Iraq, they were fewer in number,
and at a disadvantage to foreign competitors. For the remainder of the decade, US
companies would sit in the shadows of their Western European competitors. However,
they would not be far behind. For many of Iraq’s projects to succeed, they would need
access to western high-technology goods, especially those from the US.
In order to obtain US and Western technology for both military and civilian
purposes, President Bakr, Vice President Saddam, and Saddam’s uncle and future
Defense Minister Adnan Khairallah, and Deputy Prime Minister Adnan Hamdani
established the Strategic Planning Committee. The short-term aim of the Committee was
to diversify Iraq’s arms sources to prevent dependency on a single power and offset the
dangers of an embargo. Its long-term aim was to develop Iraq’s own arms industry, in the
hopes of becoming the first Arab country to do so.115
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The first step in this process occurred in 1972, before the formation of the
Committee, when Saddam Hussein traveled to Paris and met French President Georges
Pompidou. Iraq wanted French arms and France wanted oil at concessionary prices.
Under the deal reached during this meeting, France agreed to sell Iraq 16 Alouette
helicopters and 128 Panhard armored vehicles.116 The deal was small, but it was a first
step in the growing Iraqi-western arms trade, and the first in a series of mutually
reciprocated meetings between French and Iraqi officials.
In order to branch out further, and accommodate Iraq’s growing arms imports, the
Committee solicited the services of the Beirut-based Arab Projects and Development
(APD). Run by Palestinian construction magnates Kamal Abdul Rahman and Hasib
Sabbagh, the APD had no prior experience in the armaments industry, but it did have the
necessary connections to begin to do so. The APD recommended that if Iraq were to be
the most powerful state in the Arab world, if not the entire Middle East, it would have to
acquire the arms necessary to achieve military parity with Israel, especially chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons.117 In order to do so, the APD suggested that Iraq begin a
massive drive to recruit the best and brightest engineers, technicians, and scientists in the
Arab world and diaspora.
For Saddam, one of the most important aims of the Iraqi military was to develop a
nuclear weapon. Early in 1975, Iraq turned to the USSR. However, the reactor the Soviets
provided was small, and was not equipped to produce weapons-grade uranium. Rebuffed
by the USSR, Iraq turned once more to France. Later that year, Saddam flew to Paris to
meet Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. During the meeting, France agreed to provide Iraq
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with two Osirak reactors, and provide assistance with construction and development.118
Shortly after, French technicians arrived at Tuwaitha, where construction of two reactors,
Tammuz I and Tammuz II, began. As is often the case with dual-use technologies such as
nuclear technology, there is always the concern of dual military and civilian uses.
However, Saddam was completely unambiguous about the purpose of the Tuwaitha site.
In an interview for the Lebanese newspaper al-Usbu al-Arabi, Saddam declared “the
agreement with France is the first concrete step toward the production of the Arab atomic
weapon.”119 Such red flags did not alarm the French, who continued to provide their
assistance to the project. Chirac’s eagerness to conduct business with Iraq was duly noted
in the French press, who jokingly referred to the Osirak reactors as “O’Chirac”.120 Chirac
described Iraq as a “veritable bonanza.”121 Over the years, Iraq turned to numerous
foreign companies to assist in development. For “hot cell” radiation containment units
and laboratories, Iraq turned to the Italian firm SNIA Technit. For depleted uranium, they
turned to the West German consortium NUKEM. For computers and processors, Iraq
turned to the US hi-tech giant Hewlett-Packard. For a germanium detector, Iraq turned to
the US firm ORTEC.122
Obtaining nuclear weapons was a long-term pursuit. In the meanwhile, the APD
advised that developing chemical and biological weapons could serve as a stopgap.
Western Iraq was abundant with the phosphate necessary to construct chemical weapons.
All that was needed was technical assistance in constructing a plant, and the procurement
of precursor chemicals. Iraq had approached the USSR to request help to construct a
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chemical weapons plant. The Soviets refused. Next, Iraq turned to Imperial Chemical
Industries in London, purportedly to help develop pesticides. Alarmed by the Iraqis, who
sought to synthesize pesticides which were determined to be too deadly, and thus used
nowhere in the world for this purpose, the British declined to do business. Rebuffed by
the British, Iraq turned to the US company Pfaulder. After discussions with the Iraqis,
Pfaulder appeared ready to build a chemicals plant. During the course of discussions, the
Iraqis obtained blueprints for a chemicals plant. In 1978, citing dual-use concerns, the US
State Department denied an export license to Iraq. For the Iraqis, it mattered little.
Equipped with blueprints, the Iraqis turned to several European firms to build the plant
instead.123 Thus, with blueprints from a US firm, the foundation of the Iraqi chemical
weapons program was laid.
In order to facilitate the Iraqi development program, and in order to ensure longterm success, the APD recommended an overhaul of the education system. It was not
enough to merely import Arab scientists and technicians from around the world.
Although the primary emphasis of education overhaul was aimed at fueling the Iraqi
armament program, it would have beneficial ramifications for the civil sector as well.
Using Iraq’s growing oil revenues, primary, secondary, and university education was
made free, and the number of students enrolled rose dramatically. According to historian
Adeed Dawisha:
Between 1973 and 1980, student enrollment in secondary schools rose from
600,000 to almost a million, and at universities it almost doubled from 49,000 to
96,000. In the same seven-year period, the number of university teachers
increased from 1,721 to 6,515. Thousands of Iraqi university graduates, armed
with generous government scholarships, were arriving in West and East European
capitals and cities in search of higher degrees.124
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Special emphasis was placed on opening education to girls and women, and opening up
careers which had historically been closed off or severely restricted to women. As more
Iraqi women received an education, the more they began to take part in the Iraqi
workforce. According to Dawisha, “by 1980, women constituted 70 percent of all
pharmacists, almost half of all teachers and dentists, and just under a third of all
physicians.”125 For the first time, women were allowed to enlist in the armed forces, and
enroll in the nation’s military academies.126
One of the most notable achievements of the period was Iraq’s literacy drive. In
1977, Saddam issued a decree to launch a sweeping eradication of illiteracy, making
literacy classes compulsory for all illiterate men and women.127 In typical Saddam
fashion, failure to attend literacy classes could be punished with imprisonment, where
literacy classes were also compulsory.128 Although seemingly harsh, the program proved
to be tremendously successful. By early 1980, almost 2 million Iraqis had been taught
rudimentary reading and writing, with more on the way during the coming decade. The
success of the literacy drive was duly noted by UNESCO, which closely studied the
program in its efforts to develop similar programs around the world.129
The second phase of US-Iraq relations saw the development of an alliance of
convenience. Although this phase began with deep distrust, demonstrated best by US
support for the Kurdish rebellion of 1972-1975, outstanding differences were
overshadowed by shared interests. In the Ba’ath government of Iraq, and especially in
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Saddam, the US saw a reliable and cutthroat tool to eliminate communism from Iraq, a
reliable source of oil to the economies of the West, and a cash-strapped customer for
arms and technology. In the US, Saddam and the Ba’athists found a partner to help
reduce Iraq’s dependence on the USSR for arms, and a source of arms and technology for
its modernization drive. Once again, the US operated under the assumption that it could
manipulate and control Iraqi behavior, regardless of the consequences for millions of
people in the region. By supporting Saddam with arms and components for the Iraqi
WMD program, the US entered into a de facto alliance with Iraq. By 1979, with a major
development in the region, the US found a new use for Iraq.

The New Twin Pillars: The Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War
On 16 January 1979, the Middle East was forever changed. On this day, after over
a year of unrest amid the Iranian Revolution, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fled Iran,
paving the way for the establishment of the independent and anti-American Islamic
Republic of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini. With this new development, US-Iraq
relations came to their closest yet. For the US, the Revolution saw the overthrow of one
of its staunchest allies in the region, which acted under Nixon’s “Twin Pillars” policy
(the other pillar being Saudi Arabia) as a beat cop protecting US interests in the Persian
Gulf. Iraq feared that the Shia Islamist Revolution could spread to its own predominantlyShia population. Facing a common threat to their regional interests, the US and Iraq
partnered up to contain Iran. When Saddam launched the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the US
stood with him every step of the way, providing financial aid, diplomatic cover, weapons,
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and direct intervention in order to prevent an Iranian victory and the collapse of the Iraqi
government.
The US-Iraq relationship of the 1980s came about in large part due to the failure
of US Iran policy since 1953. US Iraq policy during this period represented an effort to
contain the blowback of 25 years of trying to control Iran against the wishes of its people.
Prior to 1953, many Iranians viewed the US as a neutral arbiter between its historic foes
Britain and Russia (then USSR). In 1946, following the Soviet refusal to end its
occupation of northern Iran (conducted jointly with Britain during World War II to unseat
a pro-German Shah and facilitate the transport of Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR), the
US condemned the Soviets and demanded an immediate withdrawal. Despite being a
symbolic move, and the fact that the US was motivated more by the need to secure oil
supplies for post-war reconstruction than benevolence, the action earned the goodwill of
many Iranians.130 After that, the US adopted a more heavy-handed approach toward Iran,
one which inevitably backfired.
What followed was a systematic squandering of the goodwill of the Iranian
people. The first and most pivotal action in this regard came in 1953, when the US and
Britain launched a coup and toppled Iran’s first democratically elected Prime Minister
Muhammad Mossadeq. After negotiations with the Anglo-Iraqi Oil Company failed to
bring better terms for Iran, Mossadeq moved towards nationalization. Refusing to
compromise, Britain approached the US with the idea of organizing a coup. In order to
bring in the US, Britain played on US fears of communism, and emphasized how
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Mossadeq allowed the communist Tudeh Party to operate freely. C.M. Woodhouse, the
leader of the Iran operation, explained the strategy as follows:
Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull British chestnuts
out of the fire, I decided to emphasize the Communist threat to Iran rather than the
need to recover control of the oil industry. I argued that even if a settlement of the
oil dispute could be negotiated with Musaddiq, which was doubtful, he was still
incapable of resisting a coup by the [communist] Tudeh Party, if it were backed
by Soviet support. Therefore he must be removed.131
What followed was named Operation Ajax. Armed with suitcases full of cash, CIA and
MI6 agents solicited the services of the criminal underworld and elements of the Shia
clergy to create chaos in the streets, enabling a cabal led by General Fazlollah Zahedi to
launch a coup and reinstall the Shah.
The next 26 years of the Shah’s reign were mired by repression, torture, economic
crises, and poverty. Through his quest to turn Iran into a regional superpower, his
insatiable appetite for western arms, and over-the-top extravagance, the Shah ruined the
Iranian economy, leaving most Iranians in poverty. As Egyptian first lady Jehan Sadat
remarked to Anwar Sadat, “There will be a revolution. I can feel it. The rich here are too
rich and the poor too poor without enough of a middle class to provide stability.”132
When discontent arose, the Shah resorted to the heavy handed tactics of SAVAK, his
CIA-trained secret police, notorious for its use of torture, including techniques such as
“whipping and beating, electric shocks, the extraction of nails and teeth, boiling water
pumped into the rectum, heavy weights hung on the testicles, tying the prisoner to a metal
table heated to white heat, inserting a broken bottle into the anus, and rape.”133 This led
Amnesty International secretary general Martin Ennals to comment that “no country in
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the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran.”134 Thus, it should have been no
surprise that the Iranian Revolution was so single-minded in eliminating US influence
and charting an independent course for Iran.
The Iranian Revolution was seen by the Iraqi leadership as an existential threat.
The Ba’ath leadership believed that if the Iranian Revolution was left unchecked, it could
spread, and take root among Iraq’s Shia majority. In its ongoing territorial disputes with
the Shah, the Iraqi state viewed the Shia clergy as a potential pro-Iranian subversive
element, and thus tried to co-opt it into supporting the state. In 1969, when President
Bakr attempted to persuade senior Shia authority Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim to
condemn Iran over the ongoing Shatt al-Arab dispute, the Ayatollah refused. With the
Shia clergy refusing to follow the dictates of the state, the state undertook several
measures to silence the Shia community, such as expelling tens of thousands of “Iranian”
religious students (many of whom were not Iranian), closing down Kufa University and
confiscating its endowments, confiscation of property, and spreading rumors accusing
Hakim’s son of being an Israeli agent. These activities continued throughout the 1970s.
Recitation of the Quran on television and public religious processions were banned,
religious schools in the south were shut down, and several religious leaders were
executed by the state.135 These measures failed to pacify the Shia clergy, and instead
provided the impetus for greater organization and violent resistance. When Ayatollah
Hakim’s successor Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr published a manuscript in defense of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iraqi security services arrested him and his sister. Sadr was
forced to witness the torture and execution of his sister, before he met the same fate. Such
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gruesome measures only led to further escalation. In 1980, Sadr’s Dawa Party struck
back with a series of bombings and assassinations against state targets and officials,
including a failed attempt to kill Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz at Baghdad
University, which led to the deaths of several students.
Just as the Iranian Revolution represented a threat, it also represented another
stepping stone for Iraq’s ascendancy to the leadership of the Arab world. After the Arab
defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt’s uncontested power began to diminish. With
Anwar Sadat’s pursuit of peace with Israel, culminating in the 1979 Camp David accords,
Egypt was ostracized by the Arab world, and expelled from the Arab League. With
Egypt’s fall from grace, Iraq moved to fill the vacuum.
For Saddam, the Iranian Revolution and Camp David presented him with the
opportunity to take the final step to establish his uncontested power. After over a decade
of filling the ministries under his control with loyalists and cronies, Saddam was already
the de facto leader of Iraq. Officially, however, Bakr was still president. Despite
Saddam’s growing power, and despite Bakr’s reluctance to grant carte blanche to
Saddam, Bakr still restrained Saddam on the rare occasion. Now, in the face of a growing
Iranian threat, Bakr was seen as a liability. On 16 July 1979, Bakr resigned, citing health
reasons, leaving Saddam to assume the presidency. In order to cement the transition,
Saddam turned to his favorite tactic and launched a purge. Six days later, Saddam
convened an assembly of Ba’ath Party leaders, announcing the discovery of a Syrian plot.
In a very emotional display, alternating from puffing on a cigar to wiping tears from his
eyes, Saddam read off a list of 68 Ba’ath Party members implicated in the plot. As the
individual names were read off, plainclothes security officers arrived to drag each
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individual from the auditorium. Those left in the assembly were whipped up into a
frenzy, shouting slogans of support for Saddam. The whole affair was filmed, with
Saddam distributing tapes of the proceedings throughout the party. The unlucky 68 were
executed. To top off this grizzly affair, Saddam ordered some of the Ba’ath Party cadre to
carry out the executions.136
Saddam was now the uncontested leader of Iraq. With no internal obstacles in the
way, Saddam took the next, fatal step to claim the leadership of the Arab world, and set
his sights on Iran. Fully aware of the fear harbored by most Arab states, especially among
the Gulf Arab states of the spread of the revolution, Saddam hoped that the Arab world
would rally behind Iraq in a war against the Persian menace. Furthermore, by launching a
war, he hoped to settle a territorial dispute. Saddam believed that the demarcation of the
Shatt al-Arab waterway under the 1975 Algiers Accords was unjust. Saddam took it
further, and spoke of the need to liberate Khuzistan, the oil-rich southwestern Iranian
province inhabited by an ethnic Arab population. With Iran still in chaos, cut off from
American arms, and with the military in disarray following large-scale purges, Saddam
believed that a war with Iran would lead to a swift victory. As tensions escalated, a final
meeting was organized between Saddam and the Iranian foreign minister. Salah Omar alAli, Iraqi ambassador to the UN, hoped that war could be averted. As Ali recalled:
When the meeting finished, Saddam asked me about my own impression. I said
‘Mr. President, the war is not a joke, we will lose everything, and there is not any
guarantee that we will win the war. The situation now, the problem [is] under
your hand.’ And then he didn’t say anything. He kept silent about two or three
minutes. And then he started to talk to me. He said: “Look Salah, prepare yourself
and the United Nations. We will resume the war.137
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Soon after, Saddam tore up the Algiers accords. On 22 September 1980, Iraq took the
fatal leap, and invaded Iran.
The Iran-Iraq War marked a turning point in US-Iraq relations, one which would
see the closest period of US support thus far. Acknowledging a convergence of interests,
many US officials, including National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, advocated for embracing Iraq as a counterweight to Iran.138
Similarly, Richard Murphy recalled:
The implacability of the hatred that the Ayatollah expressed toward western
interests and particularly towards the United States, we were not hearing that from
Saddam, and on the contrary what we were hearing was a universal Arab voice
saying “support this leader.”139
With the fall of the Shah, the US doubled down in an effort to defend its tenuous position
in the Persian Gulf. In January 1980, President Carter used his State of the Union address
to establish the Carter Doctrine, declaring the Persian Gulf an area of “vital interest” for
the US, and that any threat to these interests would be met by any and all means,
including military force.140 The 1973-74 OPEC embargo and Iranian Revolution both
revealed how tenuous the US position was in the Gulf. Of course, the perceived threat of
Soviet forays into the Gulf, regardless of its merit or lack thereof, was one consideration,
but the top consideration was the emergence of a deeply anti-American Iranian
government with the potential to close the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, the Iran-Iraq War was
welcomed by the US, even tacitly encouraged. According to Brzezinski aide Gary Sick:
Brzezinski was letting Saddam assume that there was a U.S. green light for his
invasion of Iran, because there was no explicit red light. But to say the U.S.
138
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planned and plotted in advance is simply not true. Saddam had his own reasons
for invading Iran, and they were sufficient.141
With the Carter administration on its way out, the task of forming a more concrete Iraq
policy fell on the next administration.
Up to 1981, events in the war unfolded in Iraq’s favor. Since the start of the war,
the Iranian cities of Khorramshahr, Mehran, Ahvaz, Susangerd, and the surrounding areas
fell to Iraqi forces. Iran’s disorganized military failed to stem the Iraqi onslaught. With
the war going in Iraq’s favor, with its military amply supplied by the USSR and France,
and with its foreign reserves largely intact, US assistance was not necessary at this point.
However, the Reagan administration understood that this could change at any moment,
and if it did, the US should be in a position to prevent an Iraqi defeat. “We now have a
greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any time since the revolution since
1958,” wrote Middle East expert William Eagleton in a State Department telegram,
adding “on Iran our views largely converge.”142
That same year, the US began sending out diplomatic feelers to Iraq. Although the
US engaged diplomatically with Iraq, albeit indirectly and unofficially, and US
companies did business in Iraq, both countries had not enjoyed formal relations since
1967. Complicating matters further was the 1979 decision to list Iraq on the list of state
sponsors of terrorism for its support for organizations such as the Abu Nidal group. In the
wake of Yasser Arafat’s peace overtures towards Israel, most famously his 1974 speech
at the UN, Abu Nidal and hundreds of followers broke off from the PLO and joined the
Palestinian “rejectionist” camp, vowing to continue the armed struggle. Unlike the PLO,
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Abu Nidal’s tactics centered almost exclusively around terrorism, opting to attack Israeli
and dissident targets around the world, while making next to no contributions on the
battlefield. Seeking influence in the rejectionist camp, and to use the group as a covert
proxy, Iraq allowed Abu Nidal to move his headquarters to Baghdad.143 Despite these
obstacles, the Reagan administration launched the first step of a rapprochement between
the two governments. In October 1981, detailing his correspondence with Iraqi Foreign
Minister Saadoun Hammadi, Secretary of State Alexander Haig wrote that “the United
States considers Iraq an important country, which had been carrying out an ambitious
economic development program and which has the capacity to influence major trends in
the region.”144 As would be demonstrated later, America’s interest in Iraq’s “economic
development program” would be to secure business for US companies, and the “major
trend” that concerned the US the most was the outcome of the war. Shortly after, Haig
received a warm response from Saadoun.145
The Haig-Saadoun correspondence was soon followed by a series of meetings
between US and Iraqi officials. During the first meeting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern Affairs Morris Draper led a US delegation to Baghdad to meet with an Iraqi
Foreign Ministry delegation led by Muhammad al-Sahhaf. Draper reiterated Haig’s
statements about the US recognizing Iraq’s ability to influence major regional trends in
the region. A State Department telegram paraphrased Sahhaf as having said “a formal
resumption in diplomatic relations would not be possible until the U.S. altered its basic
Middle East policies”, especially its policy toward the Palestine-Israel conflict. Despite
143
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these outstanding differences, Sahhaf expressed a desire to engage in further talks on a
resumption of relations.146 In the next meeting, Draper led a US delegation to meet
intelligence chief Zuhair al-Omar. According to Draper, the meeting “also provided an
opportunity for me to make a strong pitch for the U.S. company bidding on the metro
project.”147 The next meeting proved to be the most important, when US officials met
with Tariq Aziz, head of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). This marked the
highest-level meeting between US and Iraqi officials since the break in relations in 1967.
Thus, according to Eagleton, “with the opening of this contact, we are in a position to
directly communicate with the leadership should we have any sensitive or particularly
important message to convey.”148
Amid these meetings, US-Iraq relations had yet to be formally resumed. Thus far,
US support for Iraq in the war effort had been confined to limited intelligence sharing on
a non-attributable basis. In late 1981, President Ronald Reagan signed a secret finding,
authorizing the CIA to pass along intelligence to Iraq, using Jordan and Saudi Arabia as
intermediaries.149 However, this was soon to change, and US assistance to Iraq would
increase. In the latter half of 1981, the Iraqi offensive stalled. The swift and easy victory
that Saddam counted on was not to be. Saddam woefully underestimated the ability of
Iran to reorganize and mount a defense. Kenneth Timmerman wrote that “instead of
toppling that regime, the Iraqi invasion propped it up. Even the pro-monarchists in the
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Iranian air force closed ranks in defense of their homeland.”150 By 1982, Iranian forces
had managed to expel Iraqi forces from most of the territory they had occupied. In the
process, over 40,000 Iraqi troops had fallen into Iranian hands as prisoners of war.151 In
response, Saddam offered a ceasefire. The Iranian leadership debated what to do next.
David Crist detailed the debate that followed:
A divided Iranian leadership debated its next steps in the war. No one advocated
accepting the ceasefire suddenly offered by Saddam Hussein. Ayatollah
Khomeini’s son Ahmed Khomeini, as well as the chief of staff of the army,
pressed for an aggressive offensive to take Basra, overthrow Saddam Hussein,
and establish an Islamic state within Iraq. But president and future supreme leader
Seyed Ali Khamenei, foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and the pragmatic
speaker of the parliament Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, were less sanguine
about invading proper. They argued for seeking punitive reparations and ending
Saddam Hussein’s ability to threaten the revolution. The chief of the general staff,
General Zahir Nejad, opposed the invasion because he feared that the
international community would see Iran as the antagonist and not the victim of
aggression. Ayatollah Khomeini lay somewhere in between the two views. He
deeply wanted to overthrow the Baathist regime and spread the Islamic
Revolution, but he shared General Nejad’s concerns about Iran being perceived as
the aggressor. The supreme leader preferred to achieve Saddam Hussein’s ouster
without an invasion of Iraq.152
Ultimately, Khomeini was swayed into continuing the war. “The road to Jerusalem lay
through Karbala”, Khomeini declared, spurred on by chants of “War! War until
victory!”.153 Iranian forces pushed into Iraq, reaching the outskirts of Basra by summer of
1982.
Even before the Iranians decided to push into Iraq, the rout of Iraqi forces alarmed
Washington. Already, Iraq had made requests via Saudi Arabia and Jordan for further US
assistance.154 Several Arab leaders, including Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, warned of the
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catastrophic consequences of an Iraqi defeat.155 Anticipating the need to provide Iraq
with greater assistance in the war, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the list
of state sponsors of terrorism.156 Once Iranian forces crossed the border into Iraq, and
reached the outskirts of Basra, the Reagan administration decided to expand its
intelligence sharing operation. US satellites identified several weak points along the Iraqi
defense lines. Similarly, Iranians had identified the weak points, and amassed their forces
to strike. According to National Security Council advisor for Near East affairs Howard
Teicher:
The strategic Baghdad-Basra road appeared to be the target. If the Iranians could
cut the road, many analysts concluded, Iraqi forces along the front could be
routed, bringing about the collapse of Iraq and the victory of Iran. In such
circumstances, Iranian forces could march on Baghdad, intent on eliminating
Saddam Hussein and imposing a fundamentalist regime answerable to Iran.157
Using Saudi Arabia and Jordan as intermediaries, the US offered to transmit this
intelligence to Iraq. However, this time, the offer was taken a step further. The US
offered to dispatch an intelligence officer to Baghdad to brief the Iraqis of the
vulnerabilities in their defensive positions. The Iraqis accepted the full package, and soon
after, received a US briefing, complete with satellite images and maps, recommending
adjustments to the Iraqi defenses. Several weeks later, when the Iranian offensive
commenced, the Iraqis successfully fought off the Iranians, imposing heavy casualties.158
As US support for Iraq grew, US policymakers began to debate the increasingly
farcical policy of neutrality in the war. According to a 1984 Senate Foreign Relations
Committee report: “Since 1982, when the Iraqis agreed to negotiate without conditions,
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United States policy has tilted toward Iraq. The United States has taken a number of steps
to shore up Iraq and forestall an Iranian victory.”159 According to Philip Wilcox, a State
Department liaison to the CIA:
We did indeed tilt toward Iraq. We provided Iraq with intelligence, took Baghdad
off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and viewed positively comments from
Saddam Hussein suggesting that he supported an Arab-Israeli peace process.
Many began to view Iraq optimistically as a potential factor for stability and
Saddam Hussein as a man with whom we could work.160
One of the most revealing sources on the growing US tilt toward Iraq is a State
Department memorandum from October 1983. According to the document, two issues
called into question “whether this policy [of neutrality] continues to best serve our
objectives.” The two changes were “the Iranian strategy of bringing about the Iraqi
regime’s political collapse through military attrition coupled with financial strangulation
seems to be slowly having an effect.” In order to alleviate Iraq’s economic woes, the US
encouraged Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar) to persuade Iran’s ally Syria to reopen a pipeline running from
Iraq, as well as authorized US firms to assist in the construction of an Iraqi pipeline
running through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. In effect, the document concluded: “Our
policy of strict neutrality has already been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran’s
forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. The steps we have taken toward the
conflict since then have progressively favored Iraq.”161
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As Iraq’s economy teetered, the US provided economic aid which allowed Iraq to
sustain its war effort. Due to the war, Iraq’s ability to produce and export oil had fallen
precipitously. In 1982, Iran’s ally Syria closed the Banias pipeline, while the Iranian Air
Force bombed the oil terminal at Fao. Iraqi oil revenues fell from $26 billion in 1980 to
$9 billion in 1982. Falling oil revenues, coupled with war expenditures, led to a drop in
foreign reserves from $30 billion in 1980 to $3 billion in 1983. To cover the deficit, Iraq
increasingly turned to foreign loans, especially from the Gulf Arab states. By April 1983,
Iraq’s foreign debt stood at $25 billion.162 Facing their own financial woes amidst low
global oil prices, Iraq’s Gulf Arab creditors proved reluctant and unwilling to provide
further assistance. Without a source of additional funds, the ability of Iraq to sustain the
war effort was in jeopardy. Thus far, Saddam had managed to ensure public support, or at
least acquiescence to the war, by pursuing a policy of “guns and butter.”163 With the
amenities of everyday life still available in abundance, most Iraqis, with the exception of
frontline cities such as Basra, and the occasional Iranian air raid as far as Baghdad,
quality of life had remained largely unaffected. With Iraq’s dire economic predicament,
this was bound to change. To alleviate the situation, the US extended a line of credit via
the Commodities Credit Corporation (CCC). Under the CCC, the US government
encourages private banks to offer loans to foreign states and companies to buy vital
commodities such as food. In order to incentivize private banks to give loans, the US
government acts as a guarantor against default. Should a recipient default, the US
government steps in to pay the banks, while the recipient must then make payments to the
US government. According to Kenneth Timmerman: “This is how the U.S. government
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came to Saddam’s rescue. U.S. food credits and government-backed loans allowed
Saddam to devote his remaining cash resources to the war against Iran.”164
The tilt toward Iraq became more evident as US officials suggested an
increasingly accommodating stance towards Iraq’s demand for arms and technology.
Although Iraq had successfully thwarted the Iranian offensive at Basra, Iranian forces
remained deeply entrenched on the outskirts of the city, poised to renew offensive
operations. In order to assist Iraq in bringing about an Iranian rollback, Ambassador
Eagleton suggested “we can selectively lift restrictions on third-party transfers of U.S.licensed military equipment to Iraq [...] we go ahead and do it through Egypt.”165
According to NSC advisor Teicher, Iraq received arms from Egypt via a US program
known as “Bear Spares.” Under the Bear Spares program, “the United States made sure
that spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weaponry were available to
countries which sought to reduce their dependence on the Soviets for defense needs.”166
Egypt, replacing its arsenal with American weaponry after Sadat’s reorientation toward
the West, readily transferred much of its Soviet-manufactured surplus to Iraq. According
to Teicher, the US engaged in other third-party transfer agreements with suppliers of nonSoviet arms, including the supplying of cluster bombs from Chilean arms dealer Carlos
Cardoen.167
Iraq would use its western assistance to attempt a breakthrough on the battlefield.
In February 1983, amid an impending Iranian offensive, the Iraqis issued a threat: “The
invaders should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of
164
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annihilating it whatever their number and that Iraq possesses this annihilation
insecticide.”168 One of the earliest recorded cases of Iraqi chemical weapons use occured
on 9 August, when Iraqi planes dropped chemical munitions in northwestern Iran,
injuring over 50 Iranian combatants. This was followed in October when Iraqi artillery
units fired at least 20 chemical munitions at Iranian forces north of Panjwin, in northeast
Iraq.169 By November, the State Department reported “what appears to be Iraq’s almost
daily use of CW.”170 US reaction, as much of the world’s reaction, was remarkably
muted. In fact, one State Department telegram attempted to deflect criticism and portray
Iran as the guilty party:
While condemning Iraq’s resort to chemical weapons, the United States also calls
on the Government of Iran to accept the good offices provided by a number of
countries and international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed. The
United States finds the present Iranian regime’s intransigent refusal to deviate
from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of
neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among
nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims.171
The muted US response was not without cause. Calling attention to Iraqi chemical
weapons use might have also brought attention to the role that US companies and those
of America’s western allies played in assisting the development of the Iraqi chemical
weapons program, making for an embarrassing political scandal. In November 1983, the
State Department noted that “we also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production
capacity, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary.”172
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According to the 1992 Riegle Report by the US Senate, the US provided extensive
assistance, not just with chemical weapons, but biological weapons and ballistic missiles:
The United States provided the Government of Iraq with “dual use” licensed
materials which assisted in the development of Iraqi chemical, biological, and
missile-system programs, including: chemical warfare agent precursors; chemical
warfare agent production facility plans and technical drawings (provided as
pesticide production facility plans); chemical warhead filling equipment;
biological warfare related materials; missile fabrication equipment; and missilesystem guidance equipment.173
Despite these developments, and continued Iraqi use of chemical weapons, USIraq relations continued to develop without impediment. Once more the US reiterated that
it “would regard any major reversal of Iraq’s forces as a strategic defeat for the west.”174
In December, the US proceeded with two high-level meetings with the highest levels of
the Iraqi state thus far. In the first meeting, Reagan presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld
met with Tariq Aziz, where both sides expressed their common interests: “Peace in the
Gulf. Keeping Syria and Iran off balance and less influential. And promoting Egypt’s
reintegration in the Arab world.”175 In the next meeting, Rumsfeld met with Saddam
Hussein. Rumsfeld wrote that as an independent and non-aligned state, “it was incorrect
and unbalanced to have relations with the Soviet Union and not the US.” Rumsfeld also
conveyed Iraq’s interest in accepting US assistance to construct oil pipelines to
circumvent the Persian Gulf.176
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Closer diplomatic relations paved the way for a deepening in economic relations.
Despite the costs of the war, Saddam remained determined to continue his development
program. In 1984, according to a State Department memorandum, Iraq had entered into
agreements or was in the process of implementing existing agreements with the following
US companies: Westinghouse, General Electric, Bechtel, Halliburton, Deleuw Cather,
Midland International, Howe-Baker Engineers, NCR, Combustion Engineering, Bell
Helicopter, and Lockheed. The list of projects included: power plants, the Baghdad
Metro, the Iraq-Jordan pipeline, oil field equipment, a linear alkyl benzene plant, a
turnkey ammonium storage plant, an antibiotics plant, and civilian ambulance
helicopters.177 In December 1983, Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Richard
Murphy suggested that the US Export-Import (Exim) Bank provide loans to support Iraqi
infrastructure projects.178
Some of these contracts, such as the ammonium plant and antibiotic plant, should
have aroused concerns over exporting dual-use technology, yet no scrutiny was
forthcoming. For example, when asked by the House Foreign Affairs Committee if the
sale of 2,000 five-ton trucks to Iraq were for military use, a US official stated “we
presumed this was Iraq’s intention, and had not asked.”179 Increasingly, the policy of
dual-use exports to Iraq was to ask no questions.
Most alarming, the policy of asking no questions applied to the export of nuclear
technology as well. In May of 1984, the US launched a policy review for the sale of
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technology to Iraqi nuclear entities. The logic went as follows: “once the door was
opened to dual-use items being approved to non-nuclear Iraqi entities, it makes no sense
to deny them to nuclear entities.”180 The fact that Iraq had nuclear weapons aspirations
was well-known to the US government. In June 1983, the CIA published a National
Intelligence Estimate, which how “Saddam Husayn appealed for international assistance
to help the Arabs acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Israel.” In pursuit of this goal,
Iraq sought the cooperation of the USSR to develop a research and development program,
French assistance to construct the Osirak reactors at Tuwaitha, and lab technology from
Italy to develop the complete fuel cycle for extracting plutonium. Despite setbacks, most
notably the 1981 Israeli airstrike at the Tuwaitha site, Iraq remained determined to
develop a nuclear weapon.181 These warnings went unheeded, and US exports to Iraqi
nuclear firms continued. Years later, in the course of the UNSCOM disarmament of Iraq,
a UN arms inspector reported that US technology was found at Iraqi nuclear sites.182
For the US, dual-use exports of nuclear technology were not done for the sake of
assisting Iraq acquire a nuclear weapon, but to secure business for US firms in spite of
Iraq’s nuclear ambitions. Nuclear weapons were in any case, for all sides concerned, a
long-term ambition. The more immediate concern was to alter the course of the war. With
the failure of either side to achieve any territorial gains, and the prospects of any
breakthrough unlikely any time soon, the war began to move into a phase of attrition. In
1984, Iraq spread the war into the Persian Gulf. Armed with French Exocet missiles, the
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Iraqi Air Force began striking at Iranian ships, especially oil tankers. Iran responded in
kind by attacking Iraqi ships, as well as those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who were
financing the Iraq war effort and ferrying supplies for Iraq. 183 Not to mention, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE allowed Iraqi planes to refuel at their airfields.184 In turn, both sides
declared naval exclusion zones, where unauthorized ships were subjected to measures
from inspection to sinking. Additionally, Iran took to laying mines in the Gulf, including
next to the Iraqi port of Um Qasr, effectively halting shipping through the port.185 The
tanker war was born.
Saddam hoped that by taking the war into a body of water so vital to the oil trade,
he could “internationalize the war.”186 In other words, Saddam hoped to draw the
international community into the war in order to help end it, desirably in Iraq’s favor.
Saddam had ample reason to believe the international community would take the side of
Iraq. When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 552, attacks on Saudi and
Kuwaiti shipping were condemned, while attacks on Iranian shipping went unmentioned,
implying that Iran was responsible for the tanker war.187 Saddam’s move was successful
enough to ensure greater US aid, and set in motion a chain of events which increasingly
drew the US military into the Gulf. In April 1984, the White House issued NSDD 139, in
order “to deter an expansion of the conflict in the Persian Gulf.” Additionally, it called
for “consultations with the key Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrein
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[sic]”, and for a US effort to “prepare a plan of action designed to avert an Iraqi
collapse.”188
To reinforce this policy, the US launched Operation Staunch, an arms embargo
aimed at deterring foreign arms dealers from selling to Iran. According to Kenneth
Timmerman, “by 1984, as Operation Staunch frightened many potential suppliers away
from selling weapons and spare parts to Iran, Baghdad became the favorite watering hole
for the world’s arms salesmen.”189 While Iran was being strangled, Iraq engaged in a
flurry of activity to diversify its conventional arsenal, and to further develop its WMD
capability. For the bulk of its conventional arsenal, Iraq deepened its ties to the USSR
and France. For armored vehicles, Iraq turned to Brazil. For cluster bombs, it turned to
Chile. To modify the Soviet-made SCUD missile and extend its effective range, Iraq
joined Argentina and Egypt to launch the Condor program. For chemical weapons
precursors, Iraq continued purchasing materials from western countries, including the
US, where a consignment of 74 drums of potassium fluoride were discovered by US
Customs at Kennedy Airport in New York, destined for the State Enterprise for Pesticide
Production in Baghdad.190 Under license from the US Department of Commerce, Iraq
received biological samples, including anthrax and botulinum, from US firms, including
59 shipments from American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) alone.191
Heading into 1985, a new force emerged in the US, pushing for closer relations
with Iraq. As trade increased, a new lobby coalesced around Marshall Wiley. A career
diplomat with extensive experience in the Middle East, including in Iraq, Wiley brought
“National Security Decision Directive 139: Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness
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189 Timmerman, 166
190 Darwish & Alexander, 105
191 Riegle & D'Amato, 18-23
188

69

together some of the biggest companies in the US to form the US-Iraq Business Forum.
According to Wiley:
The Iraqis were not at ease with working with the U.S. private sector because
their experience until then had been primarily with the central planning structures
of Eastern Europe. So I thought we needed an organization to get to know each
other better. That’s how I got the idea for the Forum.192
The Forum rallied some of the biggest names in the US business behind it, including
Amoco, Exxon, Hunt Oil, Occidental, Texaco, AT&T, Bechtel, Brown and Root,
Caterpillar, General Motors, Comet Rice, Bell Textron, and Lockheed, among others.
Through a concerted lobbying effort, as well as connections to Reagan administration
insiders such as former Bechtel executive-turned Secretary of State George Shultz.193
With support from the business community, Reagan opened the door for hightechnology exports to Iraq. Soon afterwards, dozens of US high-technology firms flocked
to a March 1985 trade fair in Baghdad. Some companies, such as Hewlett-Packard,
followed up by opening offices in Baghdad.194 At last, Iraq gained access to the
technology needed to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Once more,
the US acted largely with disinterest to possible dual-use and diversion issues. According
to General Accounting Office report, in 1986, 16 high-technology export licenses were
issued to US firms engaged with the Saad 16 complex, despite knowledge that the site
was engaged in ballistic missile development.195
The increase in US support came at an opportune moment. In February 1986,
Iranian forces launched an amphibious assault across the Shatt al-Arab, capturing Fao.
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With the capture of Fao, Iraq’s sole oil terminus in the Gulf was cut off. Further Iranian
advances aimed at Basra and Um Qasr were thwarted, while Iraqi counter-attacks at Fao
were also thwarted.196 Once more, Iraq resorted to using chemical weapons. Reports of
hundreds and thousands dying in the most excruciating manner possible, of battlefields
littered with expended atropine needles, and an Iranian effort to send victims to capitals
in the developed world for treatment, were met largely with silence. The US was no
different, focusing instead on keeping Iraqi oil and US exports flowing.
In 1986, Saddam’s effort to internationalize the war in the Gulf began to bear
fruit. On 12 January, the American commercial ship President Taylor was interdicted by
Iranian Navy vessels in the Iranian exclusion zone. Despite protests from the ship
captain, he relented and allowed Iranian sailors to inspect the ship for war materiel and
contraband. After Iranian sailors had verified there was no contraband onboard, the vessel
was allowed to resume its course unmolested. The US responded with a State Department
letter sent via the Swiss embassy in Tehran, containing a thinly veiled threat:
“Irrespective of the legal issues involved, the visit and search of U.S. flag vessels by
Iranian armed forces during a period of heightened tensions and regional conflict could
lead to a confrontation between U.S. and Iranian military units, which neither nation
desires.”197
Following this incident, the US adopted a policy which made clear that all
measures, including military force, would be used to prevent Iranian forces from
boarding US ships. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger advocated for sending the
US Navy to escort US civilian vessels. If Iranian forces attempted an interdiction on
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suspicion of contraband, the US Navy would divert the vessel to a neutral port, conduct
an inspection, and report the results to Iranian forces. National Security Advisor John
Poindexter concurred, stating that if Iranian forces continued in their efforts to board US
ships, the “on-scene commander will use whatever means may be appropriate, including
measured military force, to forestall any such attempt.”198
Although a rigorous US response to Iranian actions and ambivalence to Iraqi
actions was yet further evidence of a US tilt towards Iraq, new developments in October
and November 1986 shed light on the true nature of this relationship. The relationship
was always an uneasy one. As Said Aburish explained, “it wasn’t a friend, Iraq was not a
friend. There was no trust. And it wasn’t an enemy, wasn’t a foe.”199 In other words,
although the US tilted toward Iraq, it did not view Iraq as an ally in the traditional sense
of the word, but rather an ally of immediate necessity. As cynical and calculating as
Saddam was, as the war dragged on, he became ever more weary of the intentions of the
US, suspecting it of engaging in double dealing. According to Aburish, who was one of
Saddam’s advisors at the time, “Saddam Hussein made it very plain to me that if the
United States wanted the war to stop, they would stop it.”200
Saddam had ample reason to suspect American duplicity. Although the US clearly
wanted to prevent an Iranian victory in the war, the prospect of an Iraqi victory was also
unappealing. “There was no great love for Saddam Hussein. Neither side was a good guy.
It’s a pity the war could not have lasted forever,” remarked Richard Armitage, who
served as Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Reagan administration.201 In October,
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in the most unlikeliest of places, Saddam’s suspicions began to appear true. In Nicaragua,
a CIA pilot shipping arms for the Contras named Eugene Hasenfus was shot down and
captured alive by the Sandinistas.202 Despite being barred by the Boland Amendment
from supporting the Contras, and despite Congress cutting off funds, the Reagan
administration remained committed to keep the secret war going. What remained unclear
was how the administration was able to continue funding the Contras. In November, the
Lebanese newspaper al-Shiraa published an expose, revealing that the Reagan
administration funded the Contra war by diverting proceeds from illegal arms sales to
Iran to the Contras. Arms sales to Iran were originally devised to act as a ransom
payment in return for Iran putting pressure on pro-Iranian Lebanese militias to release
American hostages kidnapped amid the Lebanese civil war. This policy of killing two
birds with one stone came to be known as the Iran-Contra scandal.
In the course of the Iran-Contra scandal, Iran purchased hundreds of Hawk and
TOW missiles, and spare parts, which enabled Iran to continue fighting a state which the
US was actively supporting. In the course of these secret dealings, Iran sent a request for
US military intelligence on Iraq via arms dealer and intermediary Manucher Ghorbanifar.
In order to keep the secret channel open, the US obliged. Simultaneously not wanting to
provide Iran with a decisive advantage, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert
Gates advised that any intelligence provided “would give no significant advantage to the
Iranian military.”203
Saddam protested American secret dealings and demanded a meeting with US
officials. The Reagan administration sent Richard Murphy to Baghdad to reassure
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Saddam that Iran-Contra was a one-time affair aimed at achieving narrow, short-term
interests. Despite Saddam’s earlier protests, Murphy observed that Saddam’s response to
the meeting was rather muted. According to Murphy, “It’s curious, but there was never
was clear, strong, angry protests from Baghdad, and the best interpretation I could ever
give that reaction was one of cynicism. This is what great nations do. They don’t
necessarily keep to their word or their stated policy.”204 Ultimately, Iran-Contra served as
a minor speed bump in US-Iraq relations, and continued as if nothing happened.
If Iran-Contra was indicative of how far Saddam would go to forgive the US, an
Iraqi friendly fire incident indicated how far the US was willing to go to forgive Iraq. On
17 May 1987, an Iraqi fighter jet fired two Exocet missiles at the US frigate USS Stark,
on patrol near an exclusion zone. The first missile failed to detonate, and the second one
detonated, tearing a hole through the ship. As a result, 37 US sailors were killed, and 21
were wounded. Iraq immediately accepted responsibility for the incident, issued an
immediate apology, reaffirmed the incident was an accident, and presented the US with
$400 million for a settlement fund.205 US reaction was muted, demonstrating a desire to
brush the affair off. All that Secretary of State George Shultz had to say was “this event
underlines once more the seriousness of the tensions that exist in the Middle East, and the
importance of trying to do something about them.”206 President Reagan attempted to
deflect blame for the incident, declaring “Iran is the real villain in the piece.”207
For Iraq, if there was any silver lining to the USS Stark incident, it had the effect
of drawing the US further into the tanker war. By May 1987, 227 ships had been
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attacked in the Gulf, 137 of them by Iraq, and 90 by Iran. Additionally, 153 of the ships
were oil tankers, while 211 merchant seamen had lost their lives.208 The USS Stark
incident came to the Reagan administration as a warning for urgent action in order to
bring the tanker war to a close. The next escalation in the tanker war came when Kuwait
reached out to the US, seeking armed protection for its ships. The US obliged, and
launched Operation Earnest Will. During this operation, Kuwaiti ships were reflagged
under the US flag, and were accompanied by US Navy escorts.
Earnest Will got off to a rough start. On the very first escort mission, a Kuwaiti
tanker, reflagged as the MV Bridgeton, struck an Iranian mine. Despite damage, the
Bridgeton continued onwards, while its Navy escorts huddled behind for protection. The
incident received widespread public attention, and raised doubts as to what the US Navy
was really doing in the Persian Gulf. Commenting on the incident, Rear Admiral Harold
Bernsen explained that “it may sound incongruous, but the fact is a large ship, a nonwarship like the Bridgeton, is far less vulnerable to a mine than a warship … if you’ve
got a big tanker that is very hard to damage with a single mine, you get behind it. That’s
the best defense and that’s exactly what we did.”209 Middle East correspondent Robert
Fisk raised a poignant question: “If the US Navy could not protect itself without hiding
behind a civilian vessel, how could it claim to be maintaining freedom of navigation in
the Gulf?”210
Ultimately, Earnest Will proved to be more of a political exercise, aimed at
placating America’s allies, and to satisfy demands to do something about the tanker war.
Earnest Will was a stopgap measure aimed at maintaining freedom of navigation, as well
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as a justification for an increased US naval presence in the Gulf. In order to create a
lasting solution, and to stifle the tanker war, the US decided that the best way to do so
was target Iran. Although Iran had not started the tanker war, US strategists nonetheless
opted to knock Iran out of the fight in the Gulf. Ever since the Iran-Iraq War began, US
strategists had been developing contingency plans involving direct military action against
Iran. In 1980, Admiral James “Ace” Lyons formulated a strategy involving a Marine
invasion of Kharg Island, through which almost all Iranian oil export traveled through. In
1986, US Central Command (CENTCOM) drew up a contingency plan calling for the
bombing of Bandar Abbas and the mining of its harbor. In 1987, Lyons devised a plan
outside the proper military channels, involving the bombing of strategic and economic
targets on the Iranian coast, between Chah Bahr and Bushehr.211 Earnest Will provided
political cover for an increased US naval presence, kicking off Operation Nimble Archer.
During the course of the operation, the US attacked three offshore oil rigs, converted for
military use.212
Heading into 1988, with the naval conflict escalating in the Gulf, with Iranian
resources stretched thin, Iraq renewed a series of offenses along the Iran-Iraq frontline. In
the first offensive, Saddam authorized northern commander Ali Hassan al-Majid to use
any and all means, including chemical warfare, to crush the Kurdish rebellion which
erupted amid the ongoing war and push the Iranians out of Iraqi Kurdistan. Unlike
previous Kurdish rebellions, the two dominant political parties, the Kurdish Democratic
Party and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, usually feuding among
themselves, had put their hostilities aside, and were working together with Iran to launch
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a general insurrection. In the process, the KDP and PUK welcomed Iranian forces into
Kurdistan. To crush the rebellion and expel the Iranians, Iraq launched the al-Anfal
campaign. During al-Anfal, the Iraqi military launched a genocidal onslaught on the
Kurdish population, uprooting and destroying entire villages, conducting mass
executions, and making widespread use of chemical weapons. In the most well-known
episode of al-Anfal, Iraqi forces unleashed chemical weapons on the town of Halabja,
killing upwards of 5,000 people.
Once more, amid the largest use of chemical weapons since World War I, the
official US reaction, and indeed the international reaction, was largely one of silence.
According to former CIA analyst Judith Yaphe, “very little of that was made outside of
Kurdistan, outside of Iraq. Certainly you didn’t see much of it in the American or
European press.” During a disarmament conference, Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus
recalled that his condemnations of the Halabja massacre were met with “Dead silence.
Not one in that whole, with that time 38 states conference of disarmament, all major
weapons countries involved [...] no one lifted a finger.”213 Nor was any state likely to
condemn the massacre, for fear of exposing their culpability. As Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz remarked: “If Iraq or Iran or any other state is suddenly in a position to
produce chemical weapons, the raw materials and facilities were obtained from industrial
countries. Europe is the main source. For Europe to be outraged and shed crocodile tears
is pure hypocrisy.”214 In the US, the Reagan administration opposed Congressional
efforts to sanction Iraq.215 Sanctions were rejected on the grounds that they would
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“undermine relations and reduce US influence on a country that has emerged from the
Persian Gulf War as one of the one of the most powerful Arab nations.”216 Instead, Iraq
was encouraged to continue offensive operations against Iranian positions. Joost
Hiltermann, director of the International Crisis Group, summarized the US response most
succinctly: “By any measure, the American record on Halabja is shameful.”217
After Halabja, Iraq judged that international condemnation for chemical weapons
use would be symbolic, if not nonexistent, no matter the scale and target. Far from
condemning Iraq, the US dispatched a team of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
officers to Baghdad to deliver satellite intelligence and targeting arrays. A month after
Halabja, in April, Iraq launched Operation Blessed Ramadan, with the aim of recapturing
Fao. Following a massive air force onslaught, using both conventional and chemical
munitions, Iraqi infantry units stormed and recaptured Fao.218 After the battle, DIA
officer Rick Francona surveyed the aftermath, and reported witnessing a battlefield
littered with hundreds of atropine syringes, used to counteract the effects of sarin.219
Days after the recapture of Fao, the US launched Operation Praying Mantis. After a series
of mutual escalations, such as the US Navy harassing the Iranian Navy, the Iranians
ramping up mine-laying activities, and the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts nearly sinking
after striking four Iranian mines, a day-long naval battle erupted on 14 April. Defense
Department historian David Crist documented the outcome of the battle as follows:
The daylong fight had been a disaster for Iran. Although the United States
lost one helicopter to nonhostile causes, the Iranian military had committed its air
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and naval forces piecemeal into the Gulf. With its platforms destroyed and unable
to get any air surveillance over the Gulf, Iran operated in the blind against the
U.S. Navy. The outcome was never in doubt.
After Operation Praying Mantis, Iran backed off from engaging the U.S.
military. Having lost its most capable ships, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy
kept its remaining combatants in port for most of the remainder of the Iran-Iraq
War.220
Having been expelled from Fao, and pushed back from Basra, the Iranian
leadership had to debate whether or not to continue the war. With its navy rendered
largely ineffective, and with the economy collapsing, the Iranian leadership had to weigh
the uncertain possibility that Iraq would cross the Iranian border once more. For
Khomeini, the prospect of suing for peace with the hated Saddam was unappealing, nor
was the prospect of continuing a mutually destructive war with no end in sight. Iran was
well aware that the US tilted toward Iraq, the naval engagements of 1987-1988
eliminated any doubts as to where the US stood. Then, on 3 July, the US missile cruiser
USS Vincennes fired a missile at Iran Air Flight 655, flying over the Persian Gulf en route
to Dubai. All 290 people on board were killed. The shoot-down was an accident, caused
by a mixing up of flight tracking numbers, and the negligence and aggressiveness of the
ship’s commander. The Iranians, however, were convinced that the action was deliberate,
and that the US was prepared to shoot down more Iranian civilian aircraft to force Iran to
cease hostilities. Thus, Iran sued for peace, and accepted a ceasefire under UN Resolution
598. “Woe upon me that I am still alive and have drunk the poisoned chalice of the
resolution,” lamented Khomeini.221
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According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), upon conclusion of the
war, approximately 750,000 Iranians and 500,000 Iraqis lay dead.222 After 8 years, the
war ended in a stalemate, with both sides having failed in their stated objectives. The
Iran-Iraq border remained where it was with the start of the war, as did the dividing line
along the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq failed to annex Khuzestan, and each side failed to uproot the
leadership of the other side. Far from being able to claim the leadership of the Arab
world, Iraq accumulated a foreign debt of $100 billion.223 According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the vast majority of Iraq’s expenditures
from 1980 to 1990 were dedicated to arms purchases. During this period, Iraq spent $80
billion on arms, compared to France ($69.5 billion) and Britain ($68.6 billion).224 Despite
these massive expenditures, Iraq had little to show for 8 years of war.
Nonetheless, Saddam declared victory. To commemorate this so-called victory,
Saddam ordered the construction of a victory monument, comprised of two hands holding
a pair of crossed swords. This was followed by a victory parade, with Saddam leading the
procession through the Victory Arch. Saddam was very appreciative of the US role in
bringing about this “victory.” As part of its reward, Iraq granted US intelligence officers
the opportunity to inspect and disassemble some of the latest Soviet weaponry.
According to David Crist, US Army analysts produced a report of a Soviet artillery piece
with an unusual caveat: “Secret/Not Releasable to Foreign Countries Except Iraq.” In
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turn, Saddam named a new division of the Republican Guard “the Tawakalna Division,
short for Tawakalna Ala Allah, or ‘In God We Trust,’the motto of the United States.”225
For the US, the outcome of the war was seen as a success. US assistance had
helped avert an Iraqi collapse, and helped stem the spread of the Iranian Revolution. Iraq
had proven its worth to the US, so much so that policymakers began to speak of
resurrecting Nixon’s Twin Pillars policy. To this effect, the George H.W. Bush
administration issued National Security Directive (NSD) 26, under the assumption that
“normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term
interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and Middle East.” Among its provisions,
NSD 26 called for “U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy,”
for “developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment” through
“sales of non-lethal military assistance [...] on a case by case basis.”226 According to NSC
advisor Teicher:
This policy was based on the assumption that Iraq and Saudi Arabia would protect
America’s vital interests in the Gulf. As a result of the tacit alliance between
Baghdad and Washington against Iran and the growing distance between Baghdad
and Moscow, NSD 26 directed the national security bureaucracy to strengthen
Iraq to ensure that it would be a force for regional stability and a deterrent against
Soviet and Iranian aggression. The tilt was complete.227
The third phase of US-Iraq relations marked the closest phase between the two
states. With the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, US support for Iraq reached unprecedented
heights, replete with carte blanche sales of conventional arms, dual-use exports, WMD
components, economic aid, and diplomatic cover for Iraq’s most heinous acts. When
Saddam launched the Iran-Iraq War, the US took no substantive effort to signal
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disapproval of Iraqi aggression, and instead offered tacit approval. After Iranian forces
expelled the invaders and pushed into Iraq in 1983, the US stood with Iraq every step of
the way to sustain the Iraqi war effort and avert an Iraqi collapse, no matter the legality or
humanitarian consequences. In the short-term, the policy was seen as a resounding
success. The spread of the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran and the Shia quarters of
Lebanon, so feared by many, did not come to fruition. Despite the fact that both Iran and
Iraq were both thoroughly drained after eight years of war and with nothing to show for
it, it was Iran which sued for peace. As the war continued with no end in sight, partly due
to US double dealings in the Iran-Contra affair, the US business community stood ready
to exploit Iraq’s enormous demand for hi-tech goods, agricultural commodities,
infrastructure development, and post-war reconstruction. For all concerned in the US, it
was regarded as a win-win scenario. Shortly after the end of the war, the illusory nature
of this success revealed itself.

Betrayal: Gulf War, Sanctions, Humanitarian Catastrophe, and Regime Change
With the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, fissures began to emerge, showing the
fragility of the relationship. Despite the passage of NSD 26, and expanding trade
relations, a countercurrent within the US government began to call for a review of USIraq relations. Absent an Iranian threat, the glue which held the US and Iraq together
began to dissolve. Despite emerging differences, the Bush administration remained
committed to deepening the relationship. This commitment remained to the very last day
before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Ultimately, the commitment to closer relations with
Iraq dissolved because the US failed to create an effective policy to clean up the mess it
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helped create. After the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was left with over half a million dead,
massive infrastructure damage on its western front, a hollowed economy, tens of billions
of dollars in debt, and a dispute with Kuwait over stolen oil. With these issues thrust upon
a megalomaniac dictator, armed with one of the largest land armies in the world,
equipped with chemical and biological weapons, aspiring for nuclear weapons, and with a
sense of impunity bestowed upon him by complicit Western governments, these issues
combined into a toxic mess, one which the US failed to address or take its due share of
responsibility. Once it became clear that Saddam was beyond control, the US turned on
its former client by launching the Gulf War, implementing devastating sanctions, and
sponsoring covert regime change efforts. Once again, growing US efforts to exert power
over Iraq, this time by force, only led to greater instability and loss of control. In doing
so, the US laid waste to a society which enjoyed one of the highest standards of living
and rate of development in the Middle East, producing one of the worst humanitarian
catastrophes of the late-20th century. When covert operations and sanctions failed to
unseat Saddam, and with the US determined to accomplish this goal, the next logical step
was war, which was launched in 2003.
One of the first fissures to develop in the relationship emerged in the last day of
the Iran-Iraq War. After the Halabja massacre, a group of 31 members of Congress put
forth the Prevention of Genocide Act in the House of Representatives. The act called for
sanctions against Iraq, prohibiting the US from importing Iraqi oil, providing loans and
credits, and exporting military equipment to Iraq.228 Immediately, the Iraq lobby launched
a lobbying effort to kill the act. Marshall Wiley of the US-Iraq Business Forum wrote a

“H.R.5271-Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988”, https://www.congress.gov/bill/100thcongress/house-bill/5271.
228

83

letter to President Reagan, lobbying against the bill. As Timmerman detailed, Wiley
“chose to write his letter on Forum stationery, which listed the organization’s impressive
roster of Fortune 500 members. It was a none-too-subtle hint of whose interests he was
defending.”229 US companies did not want to be shut out of the lucrative Iraqi market. In
agriculture, Iraq ranked the twelfth-largest market for US agriculture exports, with onethird of its food imports coming from the US.230 By 1988, Iraq also became a major
supplier of oil to the US, having risen from zero barrels in 1981 to 126 million barrels in
1988, in effect selling one out of every four barrels of its oil to the US. Additionally, Iraq
gave US oil companies preferential treatment, selling oil at $1 per barrel below the price
European companies were paying.231 Additionally, with Iraq in need of post-war
reconstruction, US companies were presented with further opportunities for business.
The lobbying effort proved successful, and the Reagan administration rejected the
act, with strategic and commercial interests taking precedence over human rights.
According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report, “It seems that the U.S. desire to
build a strategic and agricultural trade relationship with Iraq outweighed the apparent
financial risks involved and discounted evidence of Iraq’s human rights violations.”232
For US companies, this ensured the continuation of trade with Iraq, despite the fact that
Iraq was rated a “high-risk market,” and was falling behind on loan repayment.233
In short, US-Iraq relations continued, business as usual. Iraq was hungry for
foreign assistance in reconstruction. The US was eager to profit from reconstruction.

229

Timmerman, 307
International Trade: Iraq’s Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export Programs (Washington
D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1990), 2
231 Ahmed, 57
232 International Trade, 2
233 Ibid
230

84

Likewise, the US was eager to continue supporting Iraq as a means of deterring and
containing Iran. However, fissures began to emerge in the relationship. First and
foremost, Iraq was faced with a crippling foreign debt, putting Iraq at odds with
American allies among the Gulf Arab states. Second, isolated but growing voices within
the US government began to call for a review of relations with Iraq. Iraq’s numerous
human rights violations were now to be scrutinized by the US, without acknowledging
the US role in tolerating and facilitating these violations. Third, Iraq continued
development of its WMD program, and took the first steps in building a domestic arms
industry.
The period from 1989 to the last day before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is
marked by contradictions in policy. In 1989, for example, the Bush administration issued
NSD 26, as detailed earlier. Exports of dual-use technologies continued, in some cases
even expanded. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, there were several efforts in
Congress to sanction Iraq, largely in response to the Halabja massacre. Iraq was also
thrust into the center of the post-Cold War US policy debate. Since the developments of
1989, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the Soviet withdrawal of over 500,000 military
personnel from Eastern Europe, to the collapse of the USSR in 1991, US policymakers
decided that the end of the Cold War would change nothing. Despite a weakened USSR
seeking rapprochement with the US, the US military posture and geopolitical strategy
would remain unchanged. However, given the diminishing power of the USSR, the US
justification for its military posture was equally diminishing. As Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell put it, “I’m running out of bad guys. I’m down to Kim Il-
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Sung and Castro.”234 During the course of the Bush administration, US strategists began
formulating a global strategy in which it would exploit the fall of the USSR to expand its
power as far across the globe as possible.
In search of new villains, US military strategists began to seek out scenarios
where US interests might, in their minds, necessitate military intervention. In one such
scenario, military strategists turned to the Persian Gulf. According to Richard Murphy:
So while observers wouldn’t have seen any basic shift in American foreign
policy, there were elements, and notably in command of the Central Command
that were entertaining the potential of a new danger from Iraq. There had been a
major annual military exercise, the commander was Norman Schwarzkopf, and he
changed the basic scenario of a threat to American interests by saying there’s no
longer a serious threat from the Soviet Union, and he introduced this scenario of
an Iraqi attack on Kuwait.235
While the US had been contemplating the possibility of a war with Iraq behind the
scenes, in public the US continued to assure Iraq that it desired a continuation of close
relations. In 1990, several developments put the US and Iraq at odds. In February, Voice
of America beamed a hostile broadcast into Iraq, replete with scathing criticisms of
Saddam Hussein.236 Likewise, Saddam made an inflammatory statement, warning that if
Israel launched any aggressive acts against Iraq, then it would “devour half of Israel by
fire.”237 In March, six Iraqis were arrested in Britain for attempting to smuggle nuclear
triggers known as krytrons from the US through Britain.238 Next, despite the Reagan and
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Bush administrations striking down Congressional sanctions, and urging a continuation
of CCC loans to Iraq, the CCC reduced Iraq’s access to commodity credits.239
Perhaps what did the most to drive a wedge between Iraq and the West was the
execution of Iranian-born British journalist Farzad Bazoft. In September 1989, Bazoft
arrived in Iraq to investigate an explosion at a missile plant south of Baghdad. Seeking to
keep news of the incident from leaking, and concealing the fact that the plant was
dedicated to arms production, Bazoft was arrested. After six weeks of detention and
abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, Bazoft was charged with being an Israeli and British agent,
and sentenced to death. Following the execution, Britain responded by recalling its
ambassador from Iraq. The execution itself was cruel enough, but Iraqi rhetoric such as
“Thatcher wanted him alive. We sent him back in a box,” fueled a growing public outcry,
driving a deeper rift between Iraq and its Western sponsors.240
Despite these developments, and growing criticism of Iraq in the west, the US
reassured Iraq that it wanted to maintain a close relationship. Secretary of State James
Baker ordered Ambassador April Glaspie to issue a formal apology to Iraq for the hostile
VOA broadcasts. Glaspie then wrote a letter to Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in which she
emphasized “President Bush wants good relations with Iraq, relations built on confidence
and trust, so that we can discuss a broad range of issues frankly and fruitfully.”241 With
regard to the Bazoft execution, the official US response was one of indifference. When
pressed by a reporter if the US was going to take any concrete steps, as opposed to
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rhetorical condemnation, or with silence as it did before Bazoft’s execution, White House
spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler replied:
I don’t know. Let me check on that. I know we have deplored this. We have made
a very strong statement. I did not think to ask, are we going to protest it or
withdraw our ambassador, et cetera. I’ll be glad to ask.242
In April, shortly after Bazoft’s execution, Senator Robert Dole led a US
delegation to meet Saddam in Mosul. The topic that dominated the talks was US media
criticism of Iraq. According to the senators present, Saddam was under the impression
that Bush was in control of the US media, just as he was in control of Iraqi media.
Senator Alan Simpson assuaged Saddam’s concerns by saying “I believe that your
problems lies with the Western media, and not with the U.S. government,” and by
describing the press as “haughty and pampered.” Senator Dole falsely informed Saddam
that the VOA staffer responsible for the hostile broadcast was fired.243
While the Bush administration sought to reassure Iraq of its intent to pursue closer
relations, Saddam continued to harbor suspicions that the US wanted to undermine Iraq.
More specifically, he believed that the US had encouraged the Kuwaitis and Emiratis to
wage economic war on Iraq. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s foreign debt had
greatly affected its ability to finance reconstruction. Saddam appealed to the Gulf Arab
states to forgive, or at least reschedule Iraq’s debt. He argued that the war with Iran was
not fought for the sake of Iraq alone, but for defense of the Persian Gulf, and indeed the
entire Arab world.244 Whereas Saudi Arabia proved more accommodating to Iraq’s
economic predicament, Kuwait demanded a full repayment of debt, and refused to amend
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the terms. Further adding to Iraq’s woes were low oil prices, largely being driven by
Kuwaiti overproduction. According to Saddam, for every dollar drop in the price of oil
per barrel, Iraq was losing $1 billion annually.245 To add insult to injury, Kuwait had been
horizontally drilling into the Iraqi side of the North Rumaila oil field, stealing up to $2.4
billion worth of Iraqi oil.246 Throughout the period, Saddam asked Kuwait to cease
overproduction, and to abide by its OPEC quota. Despite numerous meetings between
Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials, and Iraqi attempts to mobilize Arab support to put pressure on
Kuwait, Kuwait continued to overproduce oil. “Kuwait neither accepts nor is bound by its
assigned quota,” declared Kuwait oil minister Ali Khalifa al-Sabah.247 The US was fully
aware of these developments. According to a Bush administration official:
Kuwait was overproducing, and when the Iraqis came and said, ‘Can you do
something about it?’ the Kuwaitis said, ‘Sit on it.’ And they didn’t even say it
nicely. They were nasty about it. They were stupid. They were arrogant. They
were terrible.248
With tensions mounting and the threat of war looming over the horizon, Iraq and
the rest of the world looked to the US for a response. Amid the deployment of Iraqi armor
units to the border with Kuwait, a reporter asked State Department spokesperson
Margaret Tutwiler if, in the event of hostilities, the US was obliged to step in to protect
Kuwait. Tutwiler’s response was that “we do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait,
and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.”249 This statement
was repeated by Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly during testimony before
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Congress.250 Secretary of State James Baker insisted that calls for the US to retaliate in
the event of Iraqi WMD use were “a little bit premature.”251 Amid such lukewarm and
indecisive statements, the Iraqi leadership began to conclude that, after almost a decade
of support during the Iran-Iraq War, supplying chemical weapons precursors, biological
samples, technology for its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, military intelligence,
agriculture and commodity credits, and after overlooking such incidents such as the USS
Stark and the Halabja massacre, that the US would not object in any meaningful way to
an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Saddam’s assessment of US attitudes seemed to be correct. On 25 July 1990,
Saddam summoned US ambassador April Glaspie to discuss the ongoing crisis.
According to a State Department cable, the US was fully aware of Iraq’s predicament:
Saddam wished to convey an important message to President Bush: Iraq wants
friendship, but does the USG [US government]? Iraq suffered 100,000’s of
casualties and is now so poor that war orphan pensions will be cut; yet rich
Kuwait will not even accept OPEC discipline. Iraq is sick of war, but Kuwait has
ignored diplomacy. USG maneuvers with the UAE will encourage the UAE and
Kuwait to ignore conventional diplomacy. If Iraq is publicly humiliated by the
USG, it will have no choice but to “respond,” however illogical and selfdestructive that would prove.252
When asked about the US position on the Iraq-Kuwait dispute, Glaspie responded that
“we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with
Kuwait.”253
After the meeting, Saddam was convinced that the US would not oppose an
invasion. The US had not given an explicit green light, nor had it given an explicit red
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light, but rather a yellow light. Eight days later, on 2 August, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the
course of only two days, the Iraqi military managed to occupy the entire country, sending
the ruling Sabah family into exile, and proclaiming Kuwait the 19th province of Iraq.
Immediately after the invasion, Glaspie fell under heavy scrutiny. Testifying before a
Congressional hearing, Glaspie remarked that “we foolishly did not realize how stupid he
was, that he did not believe our clear and repeated warnings that we would support our
vital interests.”254 However, as the record shows, there were no such warnings. Iraq was
given no reason to assume that a hostile action against Kuwait would be punished, neither
by her or the US government at large. As Glaspie explained in a New York Times
interview: “Obviously, I didn’t think - and nobody else did - that the Iraqis would take all
of Kuwait.”255 Thus, it appears, a partial invasion of Kuwait would have been acceptable
to the US. Just how partial was not specified, but a full invasion proved to be a fatal
mistake. Like many past US clients, Saddam made the fatal mistake of acting too
independently of the US, and growing too powerful to control. On the day that Iraqi tanks
crossed into Kuwait, Saddam outlived his usefulness to the US. From that day on, the US
sought to overthrow Saddam.
As if by the flip of a switch, cautious US rhetoric became hostile, in some cases
unrestrained. Acts of aggression, tolerated when Iran was the target, was condemned
when Kuwait was the target. “Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the
freedom of friendly countries around the world will suffer if control of the world’s great
oil reserves fell in the hands of one man,” proclaimed President Bush.256 Secretary of

254

Charmelot
Flora Lewis, “Foreign Affairs; Between-Lines Disaster”, New York Times, 19 September 1990,
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/19/opinion/foreign-affairs-between-lines-disaster.html.
256 Blum, 329
255

91

State James Baker declared “It is not about Kuwait and the flow of oil from its wells but
about a dictator who, acting alone, could strangle the global economic order, determine
whether we all enter into recession or the darkness of a depression.”257 Bush’s rhetoric
went further, comparing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with the German invasion of
Poland, and Saddam with Hitler. Likewise, Bush suggested that Saddam be subject to
Nuremberg-style trials, and handled accordingly. Failure to accede to US demands, Bush
warned, “could be world war tomorrow.” An alarmed Bush administration official
remarked that someone needed “to get his rhetoric under control.”258
From Saddam’s perspective, there was no reason to believe that the US response
would be as hostile as it was. Unbeknownst to Saddam, while the US was assuring Iraq
that it took no position on “Arab on Arab disputes”, it had been making security
assurances to Kuwait. According to Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Salem al-Sabah,
“Schwarzkopf came here a few times and met with the Crown Prince and Minister of
Defense. These became routine visits to discuss military cooperation, and by the time the
crisis with Iraq began last year, we knew we could rely on the Americans.”259 With US
assurances, Kuwait felt that it could continue its oil overproduction agenda, and blatantly
disregard Iraqi concerns. On 30 July, during one of the last Arab mediation efforts in
Jeddah between Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, the Kuwaiti delegation
declared “We are not going to respond to [Iraq] … If they don’t like it, let them occupy
our territory ... We are going to bring in the Americans.”260 By the time Iraq had invaded
Kuwait, Saddam was convinced that he had been deceived by the US. During the
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invasion, Iraqi forces discovered a Kuwaiti security memo, detailing a meeting between
US and Kuwaiti officials in 1989, in which both sides discussed a covert effort to
undermine Iraq economically. The memo read: “We agreed with the American side that it
was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to
put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common border. The Central
Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad
cooperation should be initiated between us, on condition that such activities are
coordinated at a high level.”261 The validity of the memo has been debated. The CIA, for
example, issued denials, stating that the document was a forgery, and denying that Iraq
was discussed “at that meeting.”262 Iraq claimed the document was genuine, and
submitted it to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar for review. Based on the
knowledge of past meetings between US and Kuwaiti officials, there is ample reason to
suspect that the document is in fact authentic.
The US had no intention of letting the occupation of Kuwait stand. Immediately,
the US moved to rally the support of the international community to isolate Iraq, and end
the occupation of Kuwait. Starting in August 1990, the UN Security Council passed a
series of resolutions concerning the Kuwait invasion. The first condemnation and demand
for an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal was issued under Resolution 660.263 Under
Resolution 661, the Security Council implemented an embargo against all imports to and
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exports from Iraq and Kuwait.264 Under Resolution 678, the US obtained the much
sought after approval for the use of force. In the language of the resolution: “Authorizes
Member States [...] to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution
660.”265 Inherent in the resolution were flaws which inevitably led to gross abuse of
international law, in effect giving the US a blank check to wage total war against Iraq.
Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark criticized the resolution as:
a complete abandonment of UN duty, an open and unlimited assignment of all its
power. It conveyed the authority to begin the very act the UN was created to end waging war. The Security Council delegation of power was so complete, that in
addition to giving no guidance and imposing no limitation, it required no
reporting. The Security Council did not even ask to know what was done on its
authority and in its name.266
With the passage of Resolution 678, the US set out to form a coalition to give a
multilateral veneer to US actions. This policy was outlined during the Clinton
administration by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: “We act multilaterally when we
can, and unilaterally when we must.”267 Although numerous states joined the coalition,
the US was the undisputed leader, making the critical decisions, and doing the bulk of the
fighting. UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar complained that “It was not a
United Nations war. General Schwarzkopf was not wearing a blue helmet.”268
In securing the necessary UN resolutions, and forming the coalition, the US
resorted to a combination of arm twisting and bribery. To avoid a Chinese veto, the US
promised to tone down its criticisms of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and to help
secure loans for China through the World Bank. Similarly, the USSR was promised aid

264

Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990, United Nations.
Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990, United Nations.
266 Clark, 155-156
267 Simons, 66-67
268 Blum, 317
265

94

from the US and its allies. Next were the non-permanent members of the Security
Council. Zaire was promised military aid and debt forgiveness. Ethiopia was promised an
investment deal. Zimbabwe dropped its objections after the threat of an IMF loan being
canceled. Next came the effort to enroll an Arab contingent in the coalition, providing for
an Arab facade. Initially reluctant to welcome US forces, Saudi Arabia was promised $12
billion in arms sales. Egyptian participation was secured with the US cancelling $7
billion in debt, and pressure on other states to cancel Egyptian debt as well. The US
secured Syrian participation by extending $1 billion in arms and aid, and by giving Syria
carte blanche to do as it pleased in Lebanon. Turkey, although not a member of the
coalition, allowed coalition forces to use Turkey as a staging area. This was done with the
help of $8 billion in arms, $1.5 billion in low-cost loans from the IMF, and US
sponsorship of a Turkish application to the European Community. In exchange for its
neutrality, Iran was promised a $250 million World Bank loan, its first loan since the
1979 revolution.269 When Yemen vetoed a US-backed resolution, Secretary of State
James Baker told the Yemeni delegation “that is the most expensive no vote you will ever
cast,” followed by a drastic cut in US aid.270
Amid the build-up to war, discussions of ending the crisis by diplomatic means
were conspicuously absent in the US. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraq sent out feelers
indicating its desire to negotiate and end to the crisis and affect a withdrawal. Granted,
each peace overture could individually be assessed according to its merit. According to
Just War Theory, which forms part of the foundation of international law regarding the
conduct of armed conflict, war is a last resort which is only to be used when other options
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have been exhausted.271 Iraq’s numerous peace overtures, regardless of their merit,
should at least have been explored by the US. What is clear is that the US wanted war.
While the US ignored Saddam’s overtures, his Arab neighbors proved responsive.
The Arab states involved in mediation efforts came to the conclusion that Saddam was
willing to withdraw from Kuwait, provided he be allowed to do so in a manner where he
could save face. A US Congressional staffer concurred, stating that “The Iraqis
apparently believed that having invaded Kuwait, they would get everyone’s attention,
negotiate improvements to their economic situation, and pull out … a diplomatic solution
satisfactory to the interests of the United States may well have been possible since the
earliest days of the invasion.”272 First and foremost in pushing for a peaceful settlement
was King Hussein of Jordan. Joined by Egypt, the King announced that Saddam was
willing to withdraw, provided that the Arab League did not condemn Iraq. When King
Hussein informed Bush of his intent to pursue this line of diplomacy further, Bush told
Hussein that he had 48 hours to reach an agreement that led to an Iraqi withdrawal. Bush
presented an unrealistic ultimatum, one which allowed him to make a symbolic and
insincere effort to play peacemaker, an effort which would ultimately not stand in the
way of launching a war against Iraq. 273 Seeking a pretext to maintain astronomical levels
of military spending, establish a forward military presence in the Middle East, and to
punish its former client, the US wanted war.
With a coalition ready, the US drew up a plan for war. US war planners and
policymakers were thinking big. Although exhausted by eight years of war, Iraq
maintained the largest military in the Middle East, one complimented with chemical,
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biological, and ballistic missile arsenals. The onslaught which followed was to be
merciless, targeting every level of Iraqi society, including a systematic and deliberate
targeting of the civilian infrastructure, paving the way for an enormous humanitarian
catastrophe. The exact consequences were fully anticipated by the US, under a DIA study
titled Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities. The aim of the study was to map out the
consequences of an attack on the water treatment infrastructure of Iraq. The study started
out by noting that “Iraq depends on importing specialized equipment and some chemicals
to purify its water supply.” Amid sanctions, “failing to secure supplies will result in a
shortage of pure drinking water for much of the population. This could lead to increased
incidences, if not epidemics” of diseases such as “cholera, typhoid, and hepatitis.” Prior
to the invasion, Iraq had “probably had no more than a 2-month supply “for water
treatment, and as a result of sanctions alone, “it probably will take six months (to June
1991) before the system is fully degraded.” As it stood, “the water treatment system was
unreliable even before the United Nations sanctions.” In addition to the direct
humanitarian consequences, the study weighed the consequences on the Iraqi economy,
with “pure-water dependent industries becoming incapacitated, including petro
chemicals, fertilizers, petroleum refining, electronics, pharmaceuticals, food processing,
textiles, concrete construction, and thermal power plants.”274 Despite the knowledge that
a massive onslaught would produce an enormous humanitarian catastrophe, US war
planners went through with their plans anyways.
The plan that the US military implemented was called Operations Plan (OPLAN)
1002-90. Originally devised as a contingency plan to defend against a Soviet thrust
through Iran to the Persian Gulf, the plan was revised, with Iraq taking the place of the
274
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USSR. The plan, originally devised to fight a superpower, was applied to a regional thirdworld power, already exhausted after 8 years of war. In the lead-up to the war, General
Schwarzkopf declared “the United States might obliterate Iraq.” Another US general
remarked “we are closer to war with a Third World country. However, we are making
plans as if it will be the Third World War.”275 Air Force Chief Michael Dugan remarked
that it was important to target “what is unique Iraqi culture that they put a very high value
on.”276 Fearing that Iraq might make use of its chemical and biological weapons against
the coalition, Secretary of State James Baker issued a warning to his Iraqi counterpart
Tariq Aziz: “We know that you have a vast stock of chemical weapons … Our sincere
advice is not to even think of using them. If you do, or if we feel that you did, then our
reply will be unrestrained.”277 This threat was broadly understood to include a threatened
use of nuclear weapons.
When Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm got underway, the US
response was largely unrestrained, bombing targets which went far beyond military
necessity. During the course of the air campaign, in the 42 days from 16 January to 27
February, coalition forces dropped over 88,000 tons of bombs on Iraq, equivalent to a
Hiroshima-sized bomb a week for seven weeks.278 Among the targets of the campaign
were stores, markets, residential neighborhoods, water and electrical facilities, schools,
universities, hospitals, pharmacies, and archaeological sites. In one of the more wellknown incidents of a civilian target being struck by US bombs, on 13 February 1991, two
US laser-guided bombs struck the Amiriyah civilian air raid shelter, killing everyone
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inside, save for 17 people who managed to escape after the first bomb struck. Estimates
vary as to how many people were killed, from 400 to 1,500, and given the shelter’s
capacity of 2,500, potentially even higher.279 Part of the difficulty in identifying the
number of people killed was due to the grotesque manner in which the victims perished.
British MP Tam Dalyell, who visited the shelter, reported seeing the carbonized imprints
of the victims on the walls.280 According to an account provided by the Columbia
Journalism Review:
Nearly all the bodies were charred into blackness; in some cases the heat had been
so great that entire limbs were burned off. Among the corpses were those of at
least six babies and ten children, most of them so severely burned that their
gender could not be determined. Rescue workers collapsed in grief, dropping
corpses; some rescuers vomited from the stench of the still-smoldering bodies.281
Despite earlier denials, the US admitted to bombing Amiriyah, but with a caveat. White
House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater remarked “It was a military target … We don’t know
why civilians were at this location, but we do know that Saddam Hussein does not share
our value in the sanctity of life.”282
Despite the expected fierce resistance from the Iraqis, and predictions of US
casualties running into the tens of thousands, Iraq was almost entirely powerless to stop
the US-led onslaught. According to former DIA officer and later advisor to General
Schwarzkopf, Rick Francona, the air campaign was so devastating that many US officers
forecasted a potential Iraqi withdrawal coming about without the need of a ground
campaign. “If the Iraqis were to state their intention to leave Kuwait prior to the initiation
of the ground offensive,” wrote Francona, “they might escape with much of their combat
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power intact, leaving Baghdad with the wherewithal to continue its past pattern of
unacceptable behavior.”283 As such, the US launched a ground war into Kuwait, and after
expelling Iraqi forces, pushed into Iraq. Thus, the US exceeded the bounds of Resolution
678, which called for the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, upholding Resolution
660.284 Now that Saddam had acted too independently of the US, the US set out not only
to punish Iraq for its act of aggression, but also to mercilessly destroy the monster it
helped create.
This strategy was made abundantly clear during one of the most well-known
episodes of the war. During the last days of the war in February, a column of fleeing Iraqi
soldiers were trapped in a traffic jam along Highway 80, connecting Kuwait City with
Basra. US aircraft attacked the head and tail of the over mile-long traffic jam, trapping
the retreating Iraqi forces. US aircraft then proceeded to bomb and strafe the entire
column with cluster bombs, napalm, and depleted uranium munitions. A US officer
compared the attack to a “turkey shoot,” stating that “it was like turning on the kitchen
light late at night and the cockroaches started scurrying. We finally got them out where
we could find them and kill them.”285 What was left was a mile-long scrapyard of
twisted, tangled, and charred metal, surrounded by death. Journalist Greg LaMotte, who
surveyed the aftermath, described “what you could only describe as a massacre [...] this
was the most horrific thing I had seen in my life: bodies everywhere, body parts
everywhere.”286 Tony Clifton of Newsweek described “bodies all over the place … I was
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up to my ankles in blood … there were very white-faced men going around saying,
‘Jesus. Did we really do this?’.”287
With Iraqi forces in retreat, the US continued giving chase, occupying large
swaths of southern Iraq. Despite the collapse of combat effectiveness and morale of the
Iraqi forces, and despite the US goal of toppling Saddam Hussein, US forces did not
move to occupy Baghdad. Bush administration Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
provided an explanation for why this was:
Because if we had gone to Baghdad we would have been all alone. There
wouldn’t have been anybody else with us. It would have been a US occupation of
Iraq. None of the Arab forces that were willing to fight with us in Kuwait were
willing to invade Iraq. Once you got to Iraq and took it over. And took down
Saddam Hussein’s government, then what are you going to put in its place? It’s a
very volatile part of the world, and if you take down the central government in
Iraq you can easily end up seeing pieces of Iraq fly off. Part of it the Syrians
would like to have, to the west. Part of eastern Iraq, the Iranians would like to
claim, fought over for eight years. In the north you’ve got the Kurds. If the Kurds
spill loose and join with the Kurds in Turkey then you threaten the territorial
integrity of Turkey. It’s a quagmire if you go that far and try to take over Iraq.288
Although the US wished to see Saddam removed from power, it was not willing to
occupy to accomplish this goal. Furthermore, the overthrow of Saddam was not
guaranteed to be instantaneous, with the potential of becoming a long-term endeavor. If
Saddam could not be overthrown right away, then, in the meanwhile, the “policy is to
keep Iraq in its box.”289 Instead, the US devised a series of policies to accomplish the
same goal by other means.
This policy was first put in practice in February, in the last weeks of the war,
when Bush appealed to the Iraqi people. “But there’s another way for the bloodshed to
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stop,” declared Bush, “and that is for the Iraqi military, and the Iraqi people, to take
matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside.”290
Similar statements by US officials calling for an uprising were followed by CIA
propaganda radio broadcasts, including one where a man purported to be an Iraqi defector
urged the Iraqi people to:
Rise up to save the homeland from the clutches of dictatorship so that you can
devote yourself to avoid the dangers of the continuation of the war and
destruction. Honourable sons of the Tigris and the Euphrates, at these decisive
moments of your life, and while facing the danger of death at the hands of foreign
forces, you have no option in order to survive and defend the homeland but to put
an end to the dictator and his criminal gang. Prove to your people and nation that
you are faithful and honorable sons of this generous country and this honourable
nation. Stage a revolution now, before it is too late. He thinks of himself alone.
He is not interested in what suffering you have endured the past few months of
this destructive crisis. He insists on continuing to push your faithful sons into this
massacre in defence of his false glory, privileges and criminal leadership.291
In the south, Shia militants, as well as some retreating Iraqi soldiers, launched a revolt.
Similarly, the Kurds, either forgetting or disregarding the record of US betrayals, from
1975 to sweeping Halabja under the rug, heeded the call and launched a rebellion as well.
Once more, history was repeating itself. As with the “cynical enterprise” of 19721975, the US took a series of actions to ensure that the rebellion put as much pressure on
the Ba’ath government as possible, yet without being able to score a decisive victory and
threaten the territorial integrity of Iraq. By encouraging a mutiny, Bush hoped to provoke
a military coup. When a mass insurrection erupted instead, US officials were alarmed.
Bush explained that “we were concerned that the uprisings would sidetrack the overthrow
of Saddam by causing the Iraqi military to rally around him.”292 According to former CIA
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case officer Robert Baer, “we were afraid of upsetting the balance in the Gulf between
the Shia and the Sunni.”293 Providing further detail, Zalmay Khalilzad, director of policy
planning at the State Department, explained: “The partition of Iraq will not serve our
long-term interests. Iraqi disintegration will improve prospects for Iranian domination of
the Gulf and remove a restraint on Syria.”294
When the uprising erupted, the US stated its intention to stay neutral. According
to Marine Major General Martin Brandtner, “There is no move on [the part] of U.S.
forces to let weapons slip through [to the rebels], or to play any role whatsoever in
fomenting or assisting any side.”295 This assertion, however, is false, as US actions
helped ensure that Iraq could crush the uprisings and exact collective punishment on the
Kurdish and Shia populations at will. During the official surrender talks at Safwan,
General Schwarzkopf assured the Iraqis that, while Iraqi planes were barred from flying,
helicopters could be flown so long as they did not pose a threat to coalition forces.296
Whatever the intent of this agreement, it enabled Iraq to deploy troop transport and
gunship helicopters to crush the rebellions with greater ferocity and speed. Although the
US, UK, and France had established no-fly zones in the north and south, nothing was
done to halt the heliborne slaughter. Additionally, the US refused to provide direct
assistance to the rebels, and in some cases bombed arms stockpiles before the rebels
could get ahold of them. In the end, the rebellion was crushed, with tens of thousands
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dead.297 One Iraqi colonel who participated in the crackdown puts the death toll closer to
150,000.298
US actions surrounding the 1991 uprisings demonstrated the US policy of regime
change, one in which the US sought the overthrow of Saddam, but not the dismantling of
his system. This was essential to hold Iraq together to maintain a somewhat feasible
deterrent to Iranian ambitions. At the same time, the US wanted to eliminate Iraq’s ability
to conduct aggressive actions against its neighbors. In the course of the Gulf War, this
aim had been achieved in large measure with the destruction of WMD and ballistic
missile sites and with the Iraqi military as a whole being devastated. The deliberate and
systematic destruction, coupled with sanctions, ensured that Iraq would largely be unable
to rebuild its military. To further this end in the post-war period, the US lent its support to
UN Resolution 687. Among the most important stipulations of the resolution were those
which called for a complete disarmament of the Iraqi WMD program, including chemical
and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and
nuclear program. To conduct inspections, disarmament, and monitoring of Iraq’s
chemical, biological, and ballistic missile programs, the UN created the UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM). To dismantle Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, seize its
weapons-grade material, and enforce Iraqi compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, the UN issued a mandate to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).299
However, as is became evidently clear, Resolution 678 was doomed from the start. First,
as UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter explained:
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Security Council 687 is an absolute resolution … Iraq will not be found in
compliance until it has been disarmed to a 100 percent level … And this was the
Achilles tendon, so to speak, of UNSCOM. Because by the time 1997 came
around, Iraq had been qualitatively disarmed. On any meaningful benchmark - in
terms of defining Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability, in terms of
assessing whether or not Iraq posed a threat, not only to its immediate neighbors,
but the region and the world as a whole - Iraq had been eliminated as such a
threat.300
Now that Iraq had been expelled from Kuwait, the primary justification for maintaining
sanctions was disarmament. In other words, the lifting of sanctions was linked to Iraq’s
cooperation with UNSCOM. Yet the absolute resolution ensured that a mere bureaucratic
error here or a loose chemical artillery shell there would get in the way of certifying Iraq
as fully, quantitatively disarmed.
Even if Iraq had been disarmed 100 percent, down to the very last artillery shell,
with every last page related to the WMD program accounted for, it would have had no
effect on the lifting of sanctions. The US made it clear that it would use its veto power in
the Security Council to maintain sanctions in order to create and maintain the conditions
for regime change. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater remarked that “all possible
sanctions will be maintained until he is gone.” CIA director Robert Gates stated that “any
easing of sanctions will be eased only when there is a new government.” In March 1997,
despite announcements from UNSCOM officials that Iraq had been largely disarmed and
that sanctions should be lifted accordingly, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
remarked: “We do not agree with those nations that argue that if Iraq complies with its
obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, [that] sanctions should be lifted.”301
The idea of imposing sanctions in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and as
leverage for Iraqi compliance for UNSCOM was agreed upon in the Security Council.
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Where disagreement arose was over scope and duration. Sanctions against Iraq were first
implemented under Resolution 661. Under 661, all imports from and exports to Iraq were
prohibited, with the exception of shipments meant “exclusively for strictly medical or
humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian purposes, foodstuffs.”302 On its face, the
language of the resolution seemed straightforward. However, in the absence of any
working definitions for terms such as “humanitarian purposes” and “foodstuffs” ensured
that such terms could be arbitrarily defined by the members of the Security Council.
When non-permanent member Yemen proposed to create a framework to establish
working definitions for the terms, providing the Committee with a swift process to enable
the delivery of humanitarian goods, the US struck down the proposal.303 Such arbitrary
political interpretations were put to work by the US, with tragic consequences.
The primary vehicle through which the US maintained sanctions was the
Sanctions Committee. Established under Resolution 661, the Committee decided which
items could be imported into Iraq.304 The Committee staff were provided by the members
of the Security Council, and as such, all decisions made by the Committee were subject
to veto by its members. Under Resolution 661, and reaffirmed under Resolution 687, the
Committee was required to make exceptions for medical and humanitarian goods, and
foodstuffs.305 However, with no criteria established for defining what constitutes
humanitarian or medical goods, and due to the inherent operating mechanism of the
Committee, the US was able to use the body to make sanctions hurt the Iraqi people as
much as possible, barring the entry of essential goods needed to sustain life in a society.
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The US was able to maintain the sanctions through its veto power, and through the
operating mechanism of the Sanctions Committee.
The mechanism implemented by the Sanctions Committee ensured that the
overwhelming majority of urgently-needed goods would not be delivered in a timely
fashion, if at all. If any organization wanted to conduct business with Iraq, the
organization would need to enter consultations with the Committee at every step of the
way. In order to merely talk with potential Iraqi buyers, a seller needed to apply for a
negotiating license, which would be processed in three to four weeks. If in the course of
negotiations the buyer and seller reached a deal, the seller would then have to apply for a
supply license, taking up to 20 weeks. Amid the bureaucratic delay, inflation of the Iraqi
dinar spiraled further out of control, it was highly likely that the Iraqi buyer would be
forced to cancel the order, if not accept a reduced quantity of quality delivery. However,
if any change was made to the original deal, the Committee demanded the buyer and
seller start the process all over again. Throughout the process, any member of the
Committee could demand a deal be subject to further review, or strike down a deal.
Typically, it was the US and/or UK which took such actions, vetoing the deliveries of
items included but not limited to: food, medicine, clothing, toiletries, household
electronics, textbooks, pencils, vaccines, and many more. The sanctions were so strict
that when an Iraqi woman attempted mailing hand-knitted leggings for her daughter and
grandchild in London, the daughter was informed by the UK Customs and Excise that if
she wanted to receive the leggings, she would first have to apply for an import license
through the Sanctions Committee.306
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Already, by 1991, the sanctions, combined with the Gulf War, had a devastating
effect on Iraqi society. In March, one month after the war, a UN investigative team led by
Martti Ahtisaari traveled to Iraq. In his report, Ahtisaari reported:
nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of
devastation which has now befallen the country. The recent conflict has wrought
near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until
January 1991, a rather urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of
modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some
time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of
post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.307
Additionally, following a visit to Iraq, a Harvard study team published a report
forecasting that if the conditions maintained and exacerbated by the sanctions regime
persisted, 170,000 children under 5 years of age would die, largely from water-borne
diseases exacerbated by chronic malnutrition.308
The scourging of Iraqi society had gone to plan. The US hoped that by using its
veto power in the Sanctions Committee that it could prolong sanctions indefinitely,
making life within Iraq so miserable that elements within the country, namely the
military, could be compelled into launching a coup against Saddam. “We wanted to let
the people know, ‘Get rid of this guy, and we’ll be more than happy to assist in
rebuilding. We’re not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his regime. Fix that and we’ll
fix your electricity,” said a US military planner.309 Another Pentagon planner remarked
candidly: “Well, what were we trying to do with sanctions - help out the Iraqi people?
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No. What we were doing with attacks on infrastructure was to accelerate the effects of
sanctions.”310 Similarly, Colonel John Warden III commented:
Saddam Hussein cannot restore his own electricity. He needs help. If there are
political objectives that the U.N. coalition has, it can say, “Saddam, when you
agree to do these things, we will allow people to come in and fix your electricity.”
It gives us long-term leverage.311
Indeed, sanctions were effective in creating a climate for regime change, one
which the US readily exploited. In October 1991, the CIA issued a finding, creating the
Iraq Operations Group, authorizing the agency to facilitate efforts to overthrow Saddam
Hussein. The CIA partnered with Iraqi exile opposition groups such as Ahmed Chalabi’s
Iraqi National Congress and Iyad Alawi’s Iraqi National Accord, who in turn helped
connect the CIA with members of the Iraqi military with the means and desire to launch a
coup. In one such effort, the CIA enlisted a defector named Muhammad Abdullah alShawani, who in turn enlisted three of his brothers in the security services to launch the
coup. However, the plot was infiltrated and thwarted by the Iraqi security services in
1996.312 According to former CIA case officer Robert Baer, from 1994 to 1995, a series
of CIA teams, under Kurdish protection, infiltrated into Iraq, scouring for opportunities to
organize a coup, and recruit willing candidates. In January 1995, Baer reported, a CIA
team submitted a coup plan to the White House, which was ultimately rejected for
unspecified reasons.313 Amid CIA-instigated efforts, there also emerged some indigenous
coup attempts. In one such attempt, a group of military officers from the Dulaimi
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launched a failed coup. In response, Saddam engaged in collective punishment of the
Dulaimi tribe, and ultimately issued an ultimatum to the tribal leaders that they should
root out the traitors in their midst, or face greater reprisals.314
Throughout the decade, every coup attempt, both US-instigated and indigenous,
failed, some in very bloody fashion. Despite the repeated failures to bring about regime
change, the US resisted every international outcry calling for the lifting of sanctions. If
sanctions could not be used as a tool of regime change, then they could at least be used as
a tool of containment, while the US devised new strategies. UNSCOM inspector Scott
Ritter explained the US rationale as follows: “If you lift sanctions, you break
containment. If you break containment, you no longer have Saddam Hussein under
control.”315 This tactic seriously jeopardized the UNSCOM mission, and gave Iraq fewer
and fewer incentives to cooperate. UNSCOM director Rolf Ekeus warned that “The US
position is that the embargo will not be lifted as long as Saddam is on power. There is no
incentive for Iraq to cooperate.”316 Inevitably, Iraq lashed out, be it due to the
continuation of sanctions, or ever more intrusive inspections of Iraq’s most sensitive
sites, including presidential sites and the headquarters of Iraq’s intelligence agencies.
Amid the ongoing sanctions, the US put forth a muddled mix of justifications to
launch military strikes against Iraq throughout the decade. In some cases, the US claimed
to be responding to Iraqi noncompliance with UNSCOM, while in other cases, the US
claimed to be responding to other Iraqi machinations. In one such instance, US and
Kuwaiti authorities announced that they had intercepted an Iraqi plot to assassinate
former President Bush in Kuwait in 1993. However, the accusation was of dubious merit.
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According to Pentagon officials interviewed by NBC, “evidence for the plot was
questionable and that heavy-handed Kuwaiti interrogation tactics [a euphemism for
torture]” made the prisoners’ testimony useless.317 Amnesty International expressed
similar concerns, adding that the prisoners were not given a fair trial and access to
lawyers, and that they faced possible execution.318 The New York Times commented that
in order to accept the assertions made by the US government to build a case for striking
Iraq would require “a leap of faith and a complete suspension of political cynicism.”319 In
spite of these revelations, on 27 June the US launched 23 cruise missiles at Baghdad.320
Just as the UNSCOM mission was moving faster than expected, a crisis was
manufactured to provide a pretext to prolong the sanctions regime. In October 1994,
Kuwaiti UN ambassador Muhammad Abulhasan issued a formal complaint to the
Security Council, alleging that Iraq had made threatening statements to Kuwait.
According to Abulhasan, Radio Baghdad issued a statement which reads as follows:
those badly intended parties, especially the American Administration assisted by
the Chairman of the Special Commission, Rolf Ekeus, granting it the required
cover-ups, are determined in their pursuit of harming Iraq. This Administration
and its collaborators in the region, particularly the rulers of Kuwait, are
determined to prolong the embargo as long as they can in order to kill the largest
number possible of Iraqis through the policy of starvation and deprivation. This
policy means to deprive the struggling Iraqi people from medicine and the basic
needs of life and human rights [...] the Iraqi leadership does not have any other
alternative but to reconsider a new stand which will restore justice and relieve the
Iraqi people from the distress imposed upon it.
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According to Abulhasan, the broadcast constituted a “clear threat against Kuwait”, and an
attempt by Iraq to “evade its legal responsibilities under Security Council resolution
687.”321
Immediately, the issue was taken up by the Security Council, then under the
presidency of the Sir David Hannay of the UK. Hannay took Abulhasan’s accusations
further, alleging that “substantial numbers of Iraqi troops, including units of the Iraqi
Republican Guard, are being redeployed in the direction of the border with Kuwait.”322
Certainly, Iraq was growing frustrated with the unending sanctions. Equally clear was the
intent of the US and Kuwait to maintain sanctions. The US made this clear with repeated
statements linking the end of sanctions to the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.
Echoing the position of the al-Sabah ruling family, in 1993 the Kuwaiti newspaper alAnbaa declared “We say to the rotten people - yes people not leadership - of Iraq that
Kuwaitis are much superior to you and much more honourable and pure than you can
ever be … We say to Iraq as a whole, its people, its regime - present and future - you are
the lowest of the despicable and pray the Lord to vengefully chastise Iraq and O Lord
leave not even a stone in Iraq standing upright.”323 However, the impending crisis turned
out to be hot air. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his military advisors, hardly
friends of Iraq, commented that Iraq had neither the manpower or air cover to invade
Kuwait. Robert Fisk of The Independent reported that “Many reporters in the desert
discovered just a solitary Kuwaiti tank near the frontier, a vehicle which was
subsequently used only to tow their own bus out of the sand. On the other side of the
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border, there were even slimmer pickings.”324 Nonetheless, the Security Council passed
Resolution 949, condemning “recent military deployments by Iraq in the direction of the
border with Kuwait.”325 The US scored a propaganda victory, and a means by which to
delay the lifting of sanctions, despite UNSCOM’s progress in disarming Iraq.
While the US continued its pressure campaign against Iraq, the humanitarian
situation began to spiral further out of control. Through 1992, malnutrition diseases such
as kwashiorkor and marasmus in children under 5 years multiplied by 11.5 times, while
diseases such as polio, cholera, scabies, typhoid, measles, pneumonia, viral jaundice,
malaria, and diphtheria, many of which had been eradicated, had reached epidemic
proportions.326 According to a December 1992 study published in The New England
Journal of Medicine, in 1991 alone infant and child mortality rates increased more than
threefold.327 According to a study by the International Study Team, prices for staple food
items skyrocketed, such as a 247 percent increase for beef, 4,531 percent increase for
wheat flour, and items such as milk, bread, baby milk, sugar, cooking oil, rice, tea,
tomato, chickpeas, potatoes, eggs, onions, dates, and lamb in between.328 By July 1993,
the school dropout rate approached one-fifth, compared to being negligible before the
war. One Iraqi school counsellor reported that sometimes children were “so hungry that
they steal from each other. Often we have to send students home because they are too
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sick from hunger to be able to sit up.”329 In 1992, a study titled Unheard Voices: Iraqi
Women on War and Sanctions reported that Iraqi women were suffering from
malnourishment, irregular menstrual cycles, excessive bleeding, little to no access to
contraceptives, increased use of abortions (legal and illegal), skyrocketing rates of
miscarriage, and undergoing cesarean sections without anesthetics.330 In their 1995 study,
researchers Mary Smith Fawzi and Sarah Zaidi reported that as a direct result of the
sanctions, as many as 576,000 Iraqi children had died.331
Despite the growing international outcry, and an outpouring of information
documenting the devastating humanitarian catastrophe, the US was unwilling to lift
sanctions. However, the US realized that if it was to maintain sanctions at all, especially
given the fact that Iraq had been qualitatively disarmed of its WMDs, it would have to
support a loosening of sanctions. To this effect, the US voted in favor of UN Resolution
986, creating the “oil-for-food” program. “As a temporary measure to provide for the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,” the Resolution granted Iraq the ability to export
petroleum and petroleum products “sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of
one billion United States dollars every 90 days” under the strict supervision of the
Security Council. All revenues from the program were to be deposited into an escrow
account controlled by the Security Council, and released as deemed appropriate.332
Seemingly a panacea for Iraq’s humanitarian catastrophe, Resolution 986 proved
to be more political than practical. One UN aid worker described the oil-for-food
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program as follows: “We first break their legs and then offer them a crutch.”333 Worse
than that, the program proved inadequate to alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe,
warned Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Nizar Hamdoon.334 This appears to be by design.
According to Resolution 986, citing Resolution 705, Iraq was to pay up to 30 percent of
its annual petroleum revenues as compensation to Kuwait.335 Additionally, Iraq was
required to direct part of its revenues to funding UN programs in Iraq, including
UNSCOM.336 Lastly, Iraq was required to make available up to $10 million every 90
days for a list of assorted operating costs listed under Resolution 778.337 By the time Iraq
was able to purchase foodstuffs and medicines, it found that all related transactions were
still subject to scrutiny by the Sanctions Committee, inevitably leading to delay. The
delay was such that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reported that “As at 3 March
1997, no consignment of humanitarian goods authorized under Resolution 986 (1995)
had reached Iraq.”338 Lastly, with limited exceptions to oil infrastructure equipment,
Resolution 986 contained no provisions allowing Iraq to import the supplies and
equipment necessary to rebuild the civilian infrastructure, devastated and unrepaired
since the Gulf War, guaranteeing that the humanitarian catastrophe would continue.
By 1998, it was clear that the US strategy in Iraq was failing. Despite the
worsening humanitarian situation, Saddam Hussein remained deeply entrenched, with
coup after coup being thwarted. International outcry in protest of the sanctions regime
was growing, both on humanitarian grounds, and on the grounds that Iraq had been
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effectively disarmed of its WMD capability. One of the largest sources of protest against
the humanitarian situation came from within the UN. At the forefront of dissent in the
UN was Denis Halliday, Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq. Halliday reported:
I recently met with trade union leaders [in Iraq] who asked me why the United
Nations does not simply bomb the Iraqi people, and do it efficiently, rather than
extending sanctions which kill Iraqis incrementally over a long period …
Sanctions are undermining the cultural and educational recovery of Iraq, and will
not change its system of governance. Sanctions encourage isolation, alienation,
and fanaticism … Sanctions constitute a serious breach of the United Nations
charter on human rights and children’s rights.339
Hans von Sponeck, who became Humanitarian Coordinator after Halliday’s resignation,
decried “We’re treating Iraq as if it were made up of 23 million Saddam Husseins, which
is rubbish.”340 Like Halliday, von Sponeck resigned in protest, followed by Jutta
Purghart, head of the UN World Food Program in Iraq.341 In 2000, Halliday commented
that “we are responsible for a genocide in Iraq.”342
With sanctions failing to bring about regime change, US policy began to build
towards a grim, logical conclusion. As Rolf Ekeus explained, “Sanctions and war are
linked to each other. So if you go against sanctions [...] there is nothing but war left.”343
Increasingly, the US began to look towards a military option for Iraq. To facilitate this,
the US began to push for ever more intrusive UNSCOM inspections targeting some of
Iraq’s most sensitive sites, including the Ministry of Defense, and a list of presidential
sites, in the hopes that an Iraqi backlash could be used as a pretext to strike Iraq. After
Iraq refused to grant UNSCOM inspectors access to several sensitive sites, and amid US
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threats of military strikes, UNSCOM director Ekeus and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz
reached an agreement which balanced Iraq’s security concerns with UNSCOM’s
inspection mission.344 According to Scott Ritter, this agreement, plus the failure of the
Shawani coup, “was a strategic disaster for US Iraq policy.”345 Deprived of a plausibly
deniable covert operations option, and with the resumption of UNSCOM inspections
denying the US a pretext to strike Iraq, the US doubled down, pushing for more intrusive
sanctions.
By late-1997, Iraq’s patience had worn thin. With the failure of the oil-for-food
program to deliver any aid, with cooperation with UNSCOM not yielding a lifting of
sanctions, and suspicions that the US was using UNSCOM as a means to collect
intelligence to be used in an effort to topple Saddam Hussein, Iraq took the first steps to
suspend cooperation with UNSCOM. According to Ritter, “by October 1997 the senior
Iraqi leadership realized that there could be no satisfying UNSCOM’s search for truth
without compromising the security of Saddam Hussein to an unacceptable level. After the
withdrawal of UNSCOM 207, the Iraqi government made a decision to stop cooperating
with UN weapons inspectors until what they deemed the compositional bias (i.e. too
many American and British inspectors) was addressed.”346 By August 1998, Iraq
suspended cooperation with UNSCOM, alleging that US intelligence agents were using
UNSCOM to spy on Saddam Hussein.347
Initially, US officials denied the Iraqi allegations, and condemned the Iraqi move
as an unprovoked act of noncompliance. Despite these denials, US officials later
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conceded that there was indeed a US-led effort within UNSCOM to spy on Saddam
Hussein known as “Shake The Tree.”348 To help carry out its mission, UNSCOM had
developed a sophisticated surveillance network throughout Iraq. That network was
created in large part with US assistance. Aside from the Iraqi contribution, all related UN
resolutions set no guidelines for which states should fund and assist UNSCOM, and how
much they should contribute. Naturally, the US proved the most willing to provide
assistance. Ritter commented that “the willingness of the USA to provide UNSCOM with
personnel and material support, was making me feel as if Stu Cohen and the CIA likewise
were employing tactics based upon the ‘keep your friends close, and your enemies closer’
line of thinking.”349 Besides assisting in the construction of a surveillance network used
for arms inspections, the US created a parallel, independent eavesdropping operation. The
US did not inform UNSCOM director Ekeus of this operation, nor did it share the
intelligence collected with UNSCOM. “We were very concerned about protecting our
independence of access,” remarked a US official. “We did not want to rely on a
multinational body that might or might not continue to operate as it was operating.”350
Another US official commented that Shake The Tree intercepts were “normal military
communications, not related to UNSCOM”, information which UNSCOM declared it had
no use for.351 According to military affairs analyst William Arkin, the US developed “a
diagrammatic understanding of the Iraqi government structure, as well as of the
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intelligence, security and transport organizations that protect the Iraqi leadership.”352
Ultimately, the UN admitted that “UNSCOM directly facilitated the creation of an
intelligence collection system for the United States in violation of its mandate. The
United Nations cannot be party to an operation to overthrow one of its member states. In
the most fundamental way, that is what's wrong with the UNSCOM operation.”353
Following Iraq’s decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM, the US
responded with two measures. The first was the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in
October. The Act stated that “it should be the policy of the United States to seek to
remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a
democratic government.” To accomplish this, the US would support “one or more Iraqi
democratic opposition organizations” with “military education and training,” radio
broadcasts, and “humanitarian assistance.”354 In large part, the Act was largely symbolic,
merely an open acknowledgement of the past seven years of US Iraq policy. At the same
time, moving what was largely a covert policy unambiguously into public view was
indicative of how serious the US was about regime change, and was in fact an escalation.
The next step was the launching of Operation Desert Fox by the US and UK from
16-19 December 1998. During the course of the oddly-named operation (Erwin
Rommel’s nickname was “Desert Fox”), the US launched 200 cruise missiles dropped
540 bombs on 100 targets, while British planes flew 28 sorties against 11 targets.355
Ostensibly, the aim of the airstrikes was to punish Iraq for suspending cooperation with
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UNSCOM, for expelling the UNSCOM team from Iraq, and to degrade a WMD
capability that Iraq was allegedly concealing. The latter claim has been repeated
frequently, including by Colin Powell during his infamous 2003 presentation at the
UN.356 However, this allegation was false. Although Iraq had ceased cooperation, it did
not expel UNSCOM. Instead, according to second UNSCOM director Richard Butler, it
was he that withdrew UNSCOM, on US advice: “I received a telephone call from US
Ambassador Peter Burleigh inviting me for a private conversation at the US mission...
Burleigh informed me that on instructions from Washington it would be ‘prudent to take
measures to ensure the safety and security of UNSCOM staff presently in Iraq.’ ... I told
him that I would act on this advice and remove my staff from Iraq.”357 Furthermore, the
claim that the airstrikes were aimed at degrading an alleged WMD capability is not
substantiated by the targeting array. According to military affairs analyst William Arkin:
Thirty-five of the 100 targets were selected because of their role in Iraq's
air defense system, an essential first step in any air war, because damage to those
sites paves the way for other forces and minimizes casualties all around. Only 13
targets on the list are facilities associated with chemical and biological weapons
or ballistic missiles, and three are southern Republican Guard bases that might be
involved in a repeat invasion of Kuwait.
The heart of the Desert Fox list (49 of the 100 targets) is the Iraqi regime
itself: a half-dozen palace strongholds and their supporting cast of secret police,
guard and transport organizations. Some sites, such as Radwaniyah, had been
bombed in 1991 (Saddam's quarters there were designated "L01" in Desert Storm,
meaning the first target in the Leadership category).358

“Transcript of Powell’s U.N. presentation”, CNN, 5 February 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript.05/index.html.
357 Richard Butler, Saddam Defiant: The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the
Growing Crisis of Global Security (Blaine: Phoenix Publishing, 2001), 224
358 Arkin
356
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With UNSCOM out of the country, a growing international outcry to lift the
sanctions, and the failure of the US to overthrow Iraq through a combination of sanctions
and covert operations, the next logical step was war.
In this final phase of US-Iraq relations examined in this study, the US doubled
down on a failed strategy. When US policy aims in Iraq could no longer be attained
through more indirect means, it opted to do so through direct means. In its effort to exert
more direct control over Iraq, the US only succeeded in losing control. Countless failed
coups demonstrated that Saddam’s government was too deeply entrenched to be toppled
by any action short of a foreign invasion. The victimization of the Iraqi people
throughout the 1990s had the effect of further entrenching his rule and allowing him to
present himself as the defender of a people unjustly targeted by a vindictive and
genocidal superpower. Instead of coming to the conclusion that regime change would
fail, efforts to continue regime change would only increase the suffering of the Iraqi
people, and that the US would lose more control over Iraq, the US doubled down yet
again by invading Iraq in 2003.

Afterword: The Final Betrayal, and Iraq’s Enduring Suffering
Much has been written of the 2003 Iraq War, and the deceit which led the US into
that war. It is well-known how the 9/11 attacks were exploited to set in motion a series of
regime changes in the Middle East, a grand strategy devised by a neoconservative think
tank known as the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), whose members came
to occupy the George W. Bush administration. Likewise, much has been written of the
consequences of this criminal war, from the staggering death toll, to the scourge of ISIL.
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Therefore this is not the place to excessively debate the finer points of the Iraq War.
Doing so could easily take up another couple hundred pages of analysis. However, it is
important to briefly reflect on how over sixty years of short-sighted, cynical, and failed
policies led up to this point.
The aim of this study was partly motivated by a desire to contextualize the Iraq
War against the backdrop of a much deeper history between the US and Iraq. Keeping
this in mind, the Iraq War was merely a later chapter in a long history of the US
attempting to exert its influence in Iraq, albeit a more devastating and blatant example.
Brief glimmers were given into that long and troubled history. During an interview with
CNN, a startled Donald Rumsfeld was confronted with footage of his infamous meeting
with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in the 1980s. While brief glimmers into a deeper
history emerged, they were largely glossed over, thus giving the impression that the Iraq
War was a more recent development. Perhaps this was by design. In absence of a deeper
historical context, the Iraq War incriminates the Bush administration alone. With that
context, it incriminates generations of US policymakers, as well as the the US foreign
policy establishment itself. It shows that those policymakers did not learn their lesson,
and instead decided to take the same actions over and over again, expecting different
results.
In examining the consequences of these policies, the study was also aimed at
highlighting the humanitarian consequences. Simply put, the wanton disregard of human
rights by the US has helped lead to a catastrophe for the Iraqi people. One of the more
startling revelations of the Iraq War came from a 2006 mortality study published in The
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Lancet, which found that by July 2006, 654,965 Iraqis had died as a result of the war.359
In isolation, this figure is shocking. Taking into account the death and devastation
wrought on by the Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War, UN sanctions regime, and all that followed
after 2006, it reveals a humanitarian catastrophe decades in the making. Indeed, it is an
enduring catastrophe. Most recently, after the defeat of ISIL in Iraq, the Iraqi government
reported that reconstruction would cost up to $88 billion.360
What all this shows is that US policymakers have not learned the lessons of
history, and they have not learned from the failures of their past policies, nor have they
considered the consequences of their policies for the Iraqi people. For careful observers,
many of the consequences were easily predictable. Keeping in mind the failure to bend
Iraq to the will of the US through sanctions, to make Saddam Hussein into a loyal US
client, the British failure to exert direct control after the 1920 revolt, and the failure to
exert even indirect control after the fall of the Iraqi monarchy, it should have been
evident that any further attempts to bend Iraq to the will of the west would end in
disaster. In the short-term, they might succeed. In the long-term, it would ultimately fail.
Throughout every step of the process, it came at a high human cost. Despite this, US
policymakers adopted the same fundamental policy assumption and expected different
results, with disastrous consequences for the Iraqi people, and for the region.
Why it is that US policy towards Iraq was so cynical and callous, and why the US
continued pursuing disastrous and costly policies through the decades remain open to
Gilbert Burnham et al, “Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster
sample survey”, The Lancet, 21 October 2006,
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(06)69491-9/fulltext.
360 Maher Chmaytelli & Ahmed Hagagy, “Iraq says reconstruction after war on Islamic State to
cost $88 billion”, Reuters, 12 February 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisisiraq-reconstruction/iraq-says-reconstruction-after-war-on-islamic-state-to-cost-88-billionidUSKBN1FW0JB.
359
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question. Seldom do policymakers acknowledge the cynicism and blithe disregard for
human rights, with exception to Kissinger and his infamous mantra that “covert action
should not be confused with missionary work.” Without a doubt, access to oil superseded
human rights. Without a doubt, the greed of corporations and desire of politicians to
satisfy their corporate constituents was a major factor as well. To what extent racism
played a role is unclear, and also not openly acknowledged or deeply explored. Clearly
there was a prevailing view until the George W. Bush administration that democracy was
not possible in Iraq, and that a heavy-handed dictator was needed to keep the society
from descending into chaos. For a state to engage in policies which lead to massive
suffering for another people, they often engage in thinking which portrays people in other
countries as something less than human, thus creating a justification to engage in such
callous behavior. Lastly, there remains the question as to how many of these policies
were the product of ignorance or indifference, be it towards the Iraqi people, their culture
and history, or towards US-Iraq relations. When the Nixon administration launched the
“cynical enterprise” of arming the Kurds, issues ranging from Vietnam to Watergate and
detente with the USSR sucked resources away which could otherwise have been used to
devise a smarter and more humane Iraq policy. During the Reagan administration there
was undoubtedly a great degree of indifference, one which led the US to see as nothing
more than a bludgeon to use against Iran. Such questions are not exclusive to US-Iraq
relations, and can be applied to the relations the US has with other countries. Indeed, the
US-Iraq relation is not the only “cynical enterprise” of US foreign policy, and it will
certainly not be the last if there is not a fundamental review of US foreign policy.
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